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UN PARTISAN FORCES IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT

Project MHD-3

Prepared By

8086 ARMY UNIT

(AFFE) MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT

APO 301

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UN PARTISAN FORCES
IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT
1951 - 1952
(A Study Of Their Characteristics And Operations)

Project MHD-3

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PREFACE

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The undertaking of this study was approved by the Far East Command Liaison Group in a radio message from that headquarters on 17 October 1952. This message set the final seal of approval on several discreet approaches to the subject during the late summer of 1952. Col Frederick B. Alexander Jr, then commanding the Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240 Army Unit, was of the opinion that a narrative account of some of the features of partisan operations might be of use. He therefore had referred the matter to his superior headquarters in Tokyo, from which final approval was obtained.

Lt Col Arthur S. Daley, then Commanding Officer, Military History Detachment, 8086 Army Unit, first visited the headquarters and various installations of the partisans on Kangwha-do. In October and November 1952, Colonel Daley, accompanied by Maj B. C. Mossman of the Military History Detachment, went to Paengnyong-do. Altogether the two officers spent about two weeks there talking to partisans and the American officers associated with their enterprises, observing various activities, and searching operational records.

A number of considerations dictated restrictions on the scope of the study. It was decided not to research the development of the Far East Command side of the organization, since the records should be fairly easily accessible. Rather, it seemed feasible to base the study on the activities of the partisans themselves, by and large on the operations of the so-called Donkeys which comprised the largest of the partisan groups. Certain features, including intelligence activities, were omitted for security reasons.

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A number of problems which were encountered should be pointed out. One was the language barrier. None of the American officers serving with the partisans had a knowledge of Korean. Fortunately, the interpreter assigned to the writers, 1st Lt Cho Byung Chan, ROKA, a former student at Seoul University, possessed an English-Korean vocabulary which encompassed ideas and abstractions. Nevertheless, the interviews

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with partisan leaders and staff officers required extensive editing to make the English version clear and readable. There were not only intrusions of Korean idiom but also repetitions and other idiosyncracies of phrasing resulting from the manner of speaking. It appears that these interviews provide the only present record in English of and by partisan leaders. In editing these, Colonel Daley tried not only to make the material clear and faithful but also to preserve some of the flavor of the original conversations.

Even a casual scanning of the operational records suggests an immediate question: How can the partisans inflict such heavy casualties from time to time and themselves escape relatively unscathed? It is impossible to check the figures for accuracy, except by indirect means. It is possible that exaggerations occur, just as they may be presumed to do from time to time in our own reports on enemy casualties. Even numbers may imply an estimate or round figures. Actually a well-managed guerrilla action, by its very nature, should result in a one-sided casualty list. When guerrillas blunder in the presence of an alert and aggressive enemy, they can be expected to pay dearly. These assumptions are reflected in the operational records.

Much of the material in the study is based, not on detailed records, but, as might be expected, on personal sources: The accounts of the participants, both Korean and American, and the observations of Colonel Daley and Major Mossman. It is stated elsewhere that some of the partisans had personal notes or diaries to which they referred during the conversations.

The place names in some instances posed problems. A number of them were presented phonetically, both in the records and in the discussions. Wherever possible these have been verified on the map and in the Gazeteer to Maps of Korea, Vol II, Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, Washington 16, D. C. (1950). The spelling used is that of the Army Map Service. However, the breve mark has not been reproduced in the typescript.

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Intervening historical projects of higher priority and the subsequent transfer of the officers who undertook the study have delayed its completion until the present date. Nonetheless, the report was substantially in final form at the time it was put aside in March 1953; hence its text has not been altered to reflect the cessation of hostilities in Korea brought about by the Military Armistice Agreement.

26 January 1953

Seoul, Korea

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PART I
BACKGROUND

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The present North Korean partisan forces, fighting with the United Nations against a common enemy, had their origin for the most part among the populace of Hwanghae Province. The province, generally speaking, is bounded on the north by the Taedong River, on the east by the Yesong River, and south and west by the Yellow Sea. Its rugged coast line bulges into that sea, describing a rude wedge from the mouth of the Taedong to the confluence of the Han and Yesong rivers northwest of Seoul.

The area of Hwanghae Province is 6,463 square miles. The Japanese estimated its population, as of 1941, at 1,812,208, excluding Japanese and other foreign nationals. The terrain is hilly and even mountainous; the average elevation is probably about 1,500 feet. Between the hill masses lie flat valleys, 200 to 1,500 yards wide, sinuous and fertile. A very broad crescent of rich alluvial valley is located between the Kuwol-san peaks and the Chaeryong River. The province is primarily an agricultural area, which produces bumper crops of rice, wheat, millet, beans, and vegetables in normal times. It was a leading producer of fruit. In short, it was the bread basket of North Korea. Modest amounts of coal and iron ore and other minerals were mined. There was comparatively little industry.

The provincial capital is Haeju, 79 miles north-northwest of Seoul. In 1940 it was a city of about 75,000 inhabitants. Haeju is well to the west of the main Seoul--Kaesong-P'yongyang highway and railroad. Chaeryong, north of Haeju, had about 18,000 inhabitants. In the western districts Changyon and Ongjin are the principal towns; the other populated places are villages and hamlets of thatched mud-and-wattle cottages, the homes of farming folk.

The theater of most of the events related here is the western portion of the province, west, that is, of the line Chinamp'o--Chaeryong--Haeju.

It is not within the scope of this study to investigate the local

political developments during the period from 1945 to 1950. There is evidence, however, that the Communists, both native and imported, failed to enlist the sympathies of important segments of the population of the area. In view of what happened there, one's curiosity is led to speculate on the nature of the reception accorded to the Communist's rule in less exposed territories of North Korea. The people of Hwanghae Province were closer to Korea's historical political capital and cultural center. Numbers of them had worked or gone to school there. Those who were politically informed were daunted from the start by the perils implied in the division of their country. To them the Moscow Agreement of 27 December 1945 was an ominous document, not a settlement but an annulment of their hopes. And when the North Korean Draft Act was promulgated early in 1947, some of these individuals were sure that war was imminent.

More powerful considerations were those affecting the individual citizen's future and that of his family. The Communists began their programs of repression and extinction. Men of various groups and classes soon became aware of their impending fate. Those who had property, even though humble, those who were educated -- including the educators, those who had risen to places of responsibility under the Japanese, even though minor in nature, and many others of various occupations and beliefs and walks of life felt uneasy forebodings.

The measures they adopted were various. Some, clinging to their families, their native ground, and to hope, kept quiet and tried to become inconspicuous. That could not be. There were enough Communist social and political groups to seek out everyone, ask him searching questions, press him for answers. Some slipped away south, across the border. Bolder individuals thought it healthy and wise to provide an active political opposition. They found it neither, and went to jail or disappeared. One of the survivors told us, "It was a time when we studied an escape from our homes and our families and how to go in

hiding in the mountainous area. . . .At that time the only thing we could do with our lives was to escape from the Communists."[1]

The North Korean Draft Act of early 1947 called up all able-bodied men from the age of seventeen to twenty-five. The Act hampered the formation of groups opposing the Communists; at the same time it signaled the approach of war, as did other activities in North Korea. It is clear that by then an anti-Communist underground existed. It probably now gained new recruits. It may have had connections with North Korean groups south of the 38th Parallel. It is said that this underground made, smuggled, or stole arms with which its members ambushed Communists and their police. They scattered propaganda and tried to enlist sympathizers, especially among the young people. Many of the underground men hid out in the hills, soliciting food from the country people.

This, in brief, was the situation when the Korean Conflict opened in June 1950. It can be imagined how anxiously the anti-Communists of western Hwanghae Province watched the fortunes of war. They heard with despair of the UN retreat to the Naktong River. Then in September came the Inchon landing, and in swift succession, Allied troops captured Seoul, advanced across the 38th Parallel, and entered eastern Hwanghae in pursuit of the retreating North Korean Peoples' Army. It appeared that the decisive battles of the war were being won. As far as many of the North Koreans in Hwanghae were concerned, it was being won by the right side.

The wish was father to the act. A singular and tragic drama began to unfold. Civil war flared up in the guns and myons of western Hwanghae.

Without, in many instances, waiting for the arrival of American troops, the anti-Communists began to declare themselves. For example, a resistance leader hiding in the mountain fastness of Kuwol-san returned to his native district, 10 October 1950, and alerted the people of

Sinch'on and Chaeryong. As in olden times, the aroused citizenry lighted torches and bonfires to signal the presence or the approach of the enemy. On the morning of 13 October a bitter fight began with an attack on the police station. It appears to have spread quickly throughout the district. On the 15th the anti-Communists attacked and captured an NKPA truck convoy retreating from Haeju.

At other points also it appears that the people fell upon retreating NKPA troops, and the fleeing Communist police and party officials. One account of such a clash describes the partisans as fighting mostly with clubs and stones.

After United Nations forces occupied the area, many of these anti-Communist North Koreans became members of the security units or otherwise openly professed their leanings. It can easily be imagined what a plight they found themselves in when the United Nations Forces began a major retreat a short time later, abandoning the territory completely to the enemy.

With the return of the Reds, the bloody internecine struggle in Hwanghae Province was quickly resumed. There were two courses of action: one was to go into hiding and the other was to flee from the province. Of some who chose the first there were those who hoped the United Nations Forces would quickly return. But thousands of the inhabitants were determined to escape at last from their Communist masters. The exodus began in December, reached the proportions of a mass flight, and ended in January 1951 when the Communists managed to gain the upper hand and close the exits. The fight which covered this exodus was waged by loosely organized or impromptu bands composed of the security police formed by the United Nations Forces together with the so-called "patriotic young men" --Youth Volunteers and students. It is, naturally, difficult to determine with any degree of certainty the number of people involved in this effort at mass escape. Making allowances for the usual exaggeration and duplication of figures, it can be hazarded that the total was in the tens of thousands.

Of the several thousand men who were eager to fight, very few had fire arms, and of these fewer still had ammunition. Their lack of radios was a severe handicap not only preventing communication among their bands in the field but also cutting them off from the only sources of immediate help -- the friendly war ships and aircraft. Thus their initial numerical superiority over the enemy was nullified.

The enemy moved to re-occupy western Hwanghae province with a brigade of NKPA infantry and some irregular Communist groups. By and large, these troops were much better equipped than their adversaries. Their armament included at least a few field pieces and mortars, according to the reports. Nevertheless, it required several weeks of see-saw fighting before they could subdue the resistance that confronted them and once more drive it underground.

The only available havens of refuge open to the anti-Communists were the islands that hug the western and southern coasts of the province. To these there were two principal routes of escape. One was generally west from the line Ullyul--Songhwa, that is, to the coast facing the island of Ch'o, or Ch'o-do. Here the little village of Wolsa-ri was the stage of a Korean Dunkirk. Another route of escape trended southwest from the large town of Changyon into the small peninsula whose point, in the Yellow Sea, is the Changsan-got. Due south of this cape lie three islands in a string, Paengnyong-do (the largest), Taech'ong-do, and Soch'ong-do. The tiny village of Tok-tong offered the easiest port of departure to these islands and to the small island of Wollae, which stands out of the sea eight or ten kilometers to the southwest of the peninsula. Another possible loading beach is at Monggump'o-ri, on the other side of the peninsula. It was, however, in the circumstances a more round-about way.

Tok-tong was lost first, and with it most of its defenders. On 8 January 1951, at 1515, Commander Task Group 95.7 radioed Eighth Army Headquarters:

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Incomplete info indicates majority reptd 10000 volunteers in Hwanghae Province West of Haeju are armed with Jap rifles model 99 and 38. Russian rifles type unknown and some US carbines. Contact has been ordered to ascertain apprx nmrs each types. Suitable dropping site for air drops. Additional info, related Subj, does EUSAK control any stocks Jap ammo. Believe many serviceable rifles are available which might be used by volunteer groups if ammunition could be made available.[2]

On the following morning the commander advised Eighth Army, in round numbers, of the types of rifles supposedly in the hands of the "patriotic volunteers." The total came to only 1,100 weapons. He expressed doubt as to their actual possession of "2 guns rept as 75 mortars." On the 10th of January, Eighth Army replied that certain calibers of Japanese and Russian ammunition was available and could be supplied, provided the exact nomenclature of the weapons were furnished.

By 13 January, the volunteers were losing their grip on Tok-tong. Three ROK naval vessels were standing off the shore there to handle the rescue operations and support the defense with gun fire. NKPA troops had taken Changyon, marched south, and penetrated the volunteer's perimeter, presumably by the afternoon of the 14th. ROKN No. 303 radioed on the 13th that police volunteers were then falling back on the coast at Monggump'o, that about 500 refugees had begun leaving for Paengnyong-do in seven sail junks, and that 150 volunteers were still defending Tok-tong, although short of ammunition. On the 14th No. 61 reported the situation as grave. The enemy was said to be using refugees as a front; a convoy of refugees and provisions had been trapped on the way to Tok-tong and their escort "annihilated." No. 61, herself, had been driven out to sea by enemy fire. The confidence of the volunteers was shaken by the Red artillery.[3]

By 16 January the village of Tok-tong and the neighboring shores were completely in the enemy's hands. Meanwhile the ships had continued rescue and evacuation operations. No. 61 said she had 450 aboard on the early afternoon of the day before. It was said that out of 260 armed police and 3,000 "patriots" only 20 policemen and 500 refugees had been brought out. On the 16th, 350 more were reported rescued: 100

aboard No. 61 and 250 on Wollae-do. Further efforts in that direction were impossible. That day the Korean Navy reported 1,300 people abandoned. Another report said that 100 armed policemen and 1,500 young men had scattered into the mountains of the Changsangot. It is to be noticed that all of these are round figures and their accuracy in question. No. 704, evidently recently arrived on the scene, picked up 197 young men. Among them they had 5 rifles, one light machine gun, and 1,500 cartridges![4]

The confusion was such that it was difficult to estimate the enemy's strength. A consistently reported estimate is 800, not all of whom, it would seem, were armed. Later on, No. 704 thought there were less than 100 Reds, reporting 70, of whom 30 were equipped. It is possible that these were a garrison detached from the main body to hold Tok-tong after the battle. No. 303 and No. 309, with a flotilla of small craft, two motor boats and ten sail boats, cruised the coast looking for stragglers.[5]

Meanwhile a bigger fight was progressing in the northwest corner of the province. Here, for a short time, the issue seemed to hang in the scales. By 14 January the enemy had re-entered the Songwha and Ullyul districts, and the volunteers, accompanied by many refugees, were withdrawing to the coastal hamlets, especially Wolsa-ri. ROKN vessels, Nos. 304 and 703, had closed in to assist. But the usual confused situation prevailed, although in that quarter there are 40 miles of good beach, the coast is difficult to navigate and the fighting was well inland. There was no reliable means of communication between the volunteers and the ships. Since nothing very definite was known about the enemy, it was difficult to set up air strikes. UN aircraft did apparently enter the action at least twice, and on one strike they bombed friendly North Koreans at Honae-dong.[6]

Captain Kim Jong Byok, of the ROK Army, and his so-called "yonyong" volunteers were credited with good work in the fighting there. Although,

again, the picture is not clear, Captain Kim evidently intercepted and repulsed a Red unit approaching Wolsa-ri on the night of 15 January. Then, he boldly took the offensive, marched on Ullyul, which had been captured by the enemy, retook it and marched southwards to liberate Songwha and attack Changyon.[7] If his intention had been to relieve the defenders of Tok-tong, the stroke was unhappily delivered too late.

Where the benefits were felt was at Wolsa-ri and the other improvised debarkation points along the stretch of sandy beach facing Ch'o-do. Precious hours were gained. The ROKN LST Tangyang arrived and was loading refugees aboard at the fishing hamlet of Yongsu-ri on the evening of the 17th. Over 1,000 people had already been shipped to Ch'o-do by the 16th. Provisions were being accumulated; the volunteers in Ullyul were instructed to move the rice in the district by oxcart train to the coast near the village of Hanae-dong, across the point from Wolsa-ri. A message from No. 704 expressed fears lest UN aircraft mistake these carts for the enemy's and bomb them. As noted above, Hanae-dong had already suffered such a calamity. About 4,000 kilograms of food was expected at Wolsa-ri on the evening of 16 January.[8] Considering the winter, the rapidity of flight, and the utter lack of any but primitive accomodations in the tiny settlements, it is easy to conclude that these hapless men, women, and children suffered many hardships.

Food was needed, but the young volunteers were begging for ammunition. Their fighting spirit was high, it was reported. They had, under the leadership of Captain Kim, driven the enemy back temporarily. According to No. 704's radio message dated 170230 Jan 51 about twelve hundred volunteers were still combat ready. They shared among them 690 rifles and automatic rifles, a mortar, five machine guns, and three light artillery pieces.[9] The weapons were not evenly distributed and the men were not concentrated. At the same time enemy reinforcements were anticipated. Although P'ungch'on was free of the enemy, refugees

said the enemy had been scouting the countryside a mile northeast of there on the 15th.

The lack of positive information about the enemy's strength, location, and movements was a serious handicap. The Communist troops were thought to belong to a coast brigade of infantry which was going to take over the job of occupying and defending the coastal area after crushing the local resistance. Later in the month resistance leaders estimated that there had been about 500 NKPA troops in Changyong gun as of January when they were engaged by the Hwanghae-do volunteers. They were infantrymen supported by "several" 76-mm. guns. They spread throughout the gun, or county, with the evident mission of restoring Communist control. An NKPA force of unknown strength had re-occupied Chinamp'o and the vicinity. No Chinese soldiers had been identified in western Hwanghae-do.

Between early December 1950 and the last of January 1951, thousands of North Korean men, women, and children escaped from western Hwanghae-do and reached sanctuary in the islands that girdle its coast. Among these were men who were to become leaders of the partisan campaign that was born of their defeat. One of them left his home district, near Chaeryong, on the sixth of December, when the Communists approached, and made his way to an island. Another, schoolmaster, shepherded his sixty pupils safely to Ch'angnin-do, off the south coast. He learned that about 800 high-school and college students, who had fled from Ongjin, Inchon, Seoul, and neighboring towns, had already reached that and adjacent islands. Another of the partisan leaders-to-be was on his way north to do intelligence work for the ROK Army. The November retreat left him stranded at the town of Chongju, situated roughly halfway along the main highway between P'yongyang and Ah-tung, Manchuria. The place is nearly forty degrees of latitude north. Yet even there he found willing adherents, formed a guerrilla band, and finally, when

further resistance was hopeless, got out to an island off the mainland there, called Aedo-dong (XD9076). With him went 180 men. These exploits will be recounted at a further point in this narrative in the words of the actors themselves.

Thus by the end of January 1951, a number of remote little Korean islands in the Yellow Sea, unnoticed before in the course of great public affairs, suddenly had become last-stand strongholds of North Korean antagonists to the Communist regime. Among the teeming crowds of refugees there were hundreds of North Korean men who were eager to resume the fight. Many men who fully shared their sentiments still remained behind the now hostile and guarded shores of Hwanghae-do province.

The problem was to convert these untrained and unarmed volunteers into an effective fighting force and adapt their capabilities to missions advantageous to the over-all operations against the enemy.

CITATIONS
(Part I)

1. See Narrative of Donkey 13.

2. Msg, CTG 95.7 to EUSAK, 080135Z Jan 51, (Secret).

3. ROK Navy Msg, from No. 303, 13 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 303, 14 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msgs, from No. 61, 14 Jan 51.

4. ROK Navy Msg, from No. 61, 15 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 15 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msgs, from No. 704, 16 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 703, 16 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 17 Jan 51.

5. ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 17 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No 704, 16 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 703, 16 Jan 51.

6. ROK Navy Msg, from No. 703, 14 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 17 Jan 51.

7. ROK Navy Msg, from No. 703, 16 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 17 Jan 51.

8. ROK Navy Msgs, from No. 704, 17 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 304, 16 Jan 51; ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 16 Jan 51.

9. ROK Navy Msg, from No. 704, 17 Jan 51.

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PART II

THE NORTH KOREAN PARTISANS

In any consideration of the Partisans, the human factor is worth attention. Physically the North Korean partisan is a sturdy wiry man. His stature necessarily conforms to the average height of the Korean race which is around 164 cm., or about 5 feet 5 inches. Typically he is from a rural community or small town and is accustomed to an outdoor life and hardened to the vicissitudes of a rather severe climate. Hence he can endure extremes of temperature without undue complaining. Also these people are credited by the USA officers who work with them to enjoy an almost uncanny skill in moving stealthily and silently at night. The partisan does not demand much in the way of physicial comforts. By American standards his diet is simple and even frugal. Yet he can travel long distances in heavy country and back-pack heavy loads if the occasion requires it. He prefers to lift and bear loads by the exercise of his leg and back muscles. Some Americans maintain that he is not so adept at lifting and carrying with his arms. The complaint of one of the commanders that his men could not dog-trot for three miles is one indication of the standard of fitness in his group of partisans but not necessarily all partisans. It is doubtful that a leader would normally make such a demand of his men. The physicial hardihood shown by some of the severely wounded is notable. One man was shot through the chest during a raid on the mainland. He received simple first-aid treatment, walked out to the beach, and caught a ride to a nearby island on a junk. Later he was transferred to another island whence he was evacuated by air. He responded very quickly to medical care, although he reached the hospital several days after he was wounded.

Temperamentally the Korean is described as a proud and sensitive individual. He is certainly emotional and it is said he is easily stung to anger. He is capable of a ready affection and he has a strong sense of personal loyalty. At the same time, and perhaps because of these traits, he can be firm, indeed, relentless, and an exacting disciplinarian.

Here his ideas do not always coincide with those of the US Army. Although the leaders are educated men and many of their followers were students, among the rank and file partisans there are a good number of illiterates.

Like his fellow Koreans the partisan officer likes to observe the customary forms of etiquette and other social amenities. He bows slightly as he salutes, offers a friendly but dignified greeting, and is pleased when he is able to exchange compliments. He prizes gifts, however trifling, as a token of esteem. He likes to give a "presentō" too. No doubt, as with the Chinese, some element of "gaining face" is involved. A banquet is a favorite means of celebrating an occasion or honoring a visitor or associate. The principle guest is placed in the seat of honor -- or rather <u>on</u>, because it is a cushion -- and his tastes and wishes are deferred to during the party. When he decides to leave, the party ends at once. There is a good deal of formal, and sometime formidable, exchanging of native whiskey among guests and hosts. Solo and group singing is a distinctive feature of such a party. At one party our hosts sang in English, German, and Chinese, as well as in their native language. Another feature of the banquet is speech making. The guests are welcomed and lauded (through interpreters) and the aims and the ideals of the partisans may be expressed. As is the general custom in the East, women of the family are never present at such parties, but female entertainers may be.

These leaders appear to share something of the Rennaissance admiration for learning and for the virtues of the warrior. A man who is "gentle" is evidently much respected. Much of their code of conduct is based on the ethics of Confucius. Other sources are Korean nationalistic patriotism, the Wharang code, and other conceps of the leader. In conversation and speeches the claims of the "spirit" and the "spiritual" on the soldier in this conflict may be advanced and acknowledged.

These spiritual claims are in opposition to, and superior to , the claims of the material. Nonetheless the partisan has a practical code also, and the practical and the ideal may be reconciled. Most orientals live in a world of starkly real struggles for survival. As in other times and places, a leader often resorts to strategem and prefers to find his way by indirection and win his objective by wile and cunning. Obviously these methods can be of value in waging guerrilla warfare.

All in all, the oriental is in many ways much more materialistic than the American. This may seem a paradox since the oriental can also admire and pursue esoteric ethical and philosophical speculations. But if by hook or by crook the leader can obtain extra rice or weapons, an engine for his boat, or an article which he can trade to advantage, he is likely to do so, much to the exasperation of some of his American colleagues.

The Partisans' ideals of leadership are brought out by the story of the rise and fall of the leader Chang Sok Lin. The fate of Chang has left a feeling of blood guilt and during interviews with them, different leaders felt constrained to explain the circumstances. To them it seemed that Chang displayed both qualities of leadership and qualities that weakened his position and finally lead to his destruction.[1]

Chang is described as a man strong of body and mind, steady and resolute. He had good intelligence, his judgement was sound, and he could arrive quickly at a decision. Futhermore Chang carried out his plans and saw to it that his orders were obeyed. It was agreed that he was a man "full of spirit" -- a description which not only seemed to imply the possession of animation and courage but also those selfless qualities which allow a man to devote himself wholeheartedly to his duties and the needs of his followers. "He had," said one who had served with Chang, "no love of the material."[2]

If that be so, Chang suffered a fatal change of character. Another leader believed that his change set in after the truce talks began at Panmunjom and led many people to think the war would soon be over. Perhaps Chang began to take heed of his personal future. At any rate he began to betray, in the words of a colleague, a great love of money. He adopted nepotism, placing members of his family in advantageous positions such as handling captured supplies as well as the food and equipment issued by the UN headquarters. It is charged that the man began to be dictatorial. No one denied the fine record of Chang's command, which numbered 1,200 partisans by the end of 1951, or his personal accomplishments or triumphs. "He was a great leader of patriotic youth. Once a man dies he will never come back! At the same time, I feel that an unjust leader cannot be endured as a leader of a youth movement, and his death was for the good of more than one thousand patriotic youth."[3]

Certain of Chang's followers settled the matter. On New Year's Day, 1952, Chang Sok Lin was assassinated. This tragedy of a hero reveals much more about the North Korean Partisan's ideals of leadership, however its other implications may be. The Koreans themselves, must have felt this way about it and that is why two of the outstanding leaders wanted to explain the affair as carefully as they could.

The Partisans agree in distinguishing between regular army ideas of leadership and discipline and their own concept. They do not accept what they consider to be unreasonable orders, or dictatorial procedures, or the exhibition of favoritism. It may go for a time but sooner or later there will be a showdown. No other leader has suffered the fate of Chang Sok Lin, but lesser leaders have been deposed. The unit may take a vote on the issue, and depose a leader by two-thirds majority. The removal of a leader was referred to as "taking away his pistol"[4] - i.e., he was required to turn in the pistol which is a badge of rank

and authority. The new leader is chosen by majority vote. The popular occidental picture of the submissive oriental is not borne out by the proud and independent behavior of many of these people. It is true that they have much respect and deference for a man of position, and it need not be forgotten that they will submit to treatment of a kind most of our men would resent. Nonetheless, in these circumstances at least, the leader must prove himself worthy of his trust. And while he is the unit commander, he holds the power of life and death over his followers.

The leader does not have to be a fighting man. He loses no prestige, no "face," by staying out of combat and running his unit entirely from its island base. As a matter of fact very few of the leaders are fighting leaders and most of them might be described as political leaders. The partisans are not at all romantic in this respect; they can see the practicality of having the leader stay off the mainland where he would run very real risks of being killed or -- even worse -- captured by the enemy. Usually they are well-known in different districts of the province and would be likely to be recognized. However, some go in on occasion, and several have been lost while operating in the interior. There are advantages in having political leaders. They have many connections with friends and sympathizers on the mainland, and this adds enormously to their effectiveness. Furthermore since in this way they reach and influence many followers, in addition to the men in their units, they gain valuable results in the field of psychological warfare, which is an important sector of this struggle. In units where the leader is not a tactical commander his chief of staff is the tactician and in all units this officer is directly concerned with operations.

These leaders are by no means ordinary fellows. As for professional men among them, two principal occupations are especially represented:

teaching and public service. There are among the leaders a number of former mayors, police officials, and other public-office holders. At least six of the seven with whom we had long conversations were educated in high schools in Korea, Manchuria, or Japan. Two had taken collegiate courses. Two had been teachers at one time or another. Their civilian pursuits also included business, government service, banking, horticulture, and farming. Two of the men had been drafted into the Japanese Army and both had been selected for officer candidate training. One graduated and had served as a lieutenat before the war ended, the other had not. Two had experience in propaganda activities and three had been in intelligence for a short time. When the United Nations Forces occupied their province in the fall of 1950, three of these men had been appointed as officials in the local security forces.

They all talked to us and the Leopard Commander through an interpreter, yet there was reason to believe that three of them had a working knowledge of English. One might explain this reluctance as partly a motive of prudence and partly due to fear of being misunderstood or misquoted. They have a respect for history and said they were glad to have the opportunity to record at least some of the affairs of the partisan movement for posterity. The Leader of Donkey 13 regretted that early records of the unit had been destroyed because of another leader's jealousy of the achievements of a predecessor. But they wanted their deeds remembered and their case submitted to the judgement of the future. When they discussed their operations, they spoke easily, fluently, and at length. They were not careless about their choice of words, and occasionally notes were consulted to verify dates and figures. Neither did they sieze the chance to brag. Unfortunately their discourse can be only imperfectly reproduced here, language barriers being what they are.

There is close-knit loyalty in a partisan unit. The leader often refers to his men as "friends." For example, of one of his parties

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returned from the mainland, he is likely to say, "My friends came back this morning". In battle they exert every effort to bring off their wounded, and it is rare that one is left behind, unless they suffer a real disaster. A badly crippled man may try to cover the withdrawal of his comrades rather than hamper their get-away. Capture by the enemy is a fate to be avoided at all costs. Three instances were cited of officers committing suicide rather than be taken. It appears, however, that one of these could have got away and more probably shot himself for the sake of honor since he was losing to the Chinese the island he had been ordered to hold.

But men are captured in the course of the fighting. Very persistent efforts are then made to rescue them. The course of their evacuation by the enemy is shadowed by agents and friendly local people and the partisans in the area are often able to rescue them, by ambush or raid. Even more daring rescues have been carried out by partisan agents disguised as Communist officials. The partisans expect no mercy at the hands of the NKPA men unless perhaps to be quickly shot and so spared brutal treatment. One rescue party found some captured partisans so brutally tortured that it was impossible to remove them to a safe place. The victims were promptly dispatched along with their tormentors. Sentiment does not override prudence in such a crisis. It is claimed that two wounded Partisans, sent to Seoul for medical treatment, have been mistakenly sent to a UN PW camp. One leader would like permission to go to the PW camp neighborhood. He said he would find a way to get them out, and quickly!

By far the majority of the men in a given unit are from the same district of the province, sharing the same local interests and loyalties. Thus the units are clannish, and it is not a practice for men to be transferred from one unit to another. Along with its advantages, this has certain drawbacks. For example, specialists cannot easily be moved

about; each unit makes do with the skills and talents it has. It is rather different with the students, of whom there are many with the partisans. In place of this local patriotism they feel intense pride in being students. Unlike the United States, it is proud achievement for a young man in the orient because their money, time, and professional skill cannot be wasted on the inept and the indifferent.

Indeed educational resources are so slender that many deserving youth cannot be accomodated. Student esprit de corps resulted in the formation of a Donkey unit composed entirely of students and teachers. They adopted three mottoes expressing the principles by which they would be guided:

(1) we will follow and we will justify the Wharang spirit;

(2) we will live in accordance with the pure racial spirit;

(3) we will protect our beings as students and we will remain students.[5]

Wharang is the name of a code of conduct similar in aims and method to the chivalric code of Western Europe. It also reflects some of the ideals, such as devotion to the service of the state or prince, and some of the social virtues and graces, which are attributed to the perfect Renaissance courtier by Count Baldassare Castiglione in his Libro del Cortegiano (1518) Needless to say, these resemblances are probably often superficial even if striking. The Wharang "spirit" was produced by purely Oriental and especially Korean cultural and historical forces. It came to flower during the seventh century, A.D., when the kings of Silla sought to unify the peninsula, and it stems from the interests and values of that period.

Selected young men were reared in the creed of Wharang, which was based on the inculcation and practice of five virtues, loyalty, filial peity, fidelity, courage, and benevolence. Of these, the prime virtues were held to be courage and benevolence. The goal was to train an elite body of courtiers and soldiers to serve the kingdom. The students

who joined the Partisans like to think of themselves as the heirs of this knightly tradition. Like these warrior-courtiers of the old Kingdom of Silla they consider themselves dedicated to fighting for the unification of the fatherland.

The second motto suggests a dedication to the calls of Korean nationalistic patriotism. The third, the determination not to abandon their aspirations and, what is just as important, their identification and status as students. They do not wish to be submerged in other groups at the mercy of other interests. Even on the islands they hope to make arrangements to complete courses and to earn middle-school diplomas. In the meantime they have the reputation among other Donkeys of being first-rate fighters.

Donkey 11 is not the only unit which has expressed its aims and principles as a fighting brotherhood. The Commander of Donkey 15 stated these of his unit. "My unit has five mottoes. First, we are guerrilla forces: we will fight for freedom until the last breath of life. Second, we are free fighters: we will continue fighting until the world's freedom is won. Third, we are pioneer patriots and we will continue fighting until the final minutes. Fourth, we will dedicate our lives to our country. Fifth, we will be living with guerrilla spirits and with the spirits of the foundation of our country."[6]

Thus there are various interests and loyalties among and within the units, including the esprit de corps of individual units.

The Partisans on the Western isles began calling themselves "donkeys" almost from the beginning of their organization under supervision of the Far East Command. One of the leaders gave us his version of the origin of this epithet. According to him, it came into vogue at the time they first received radios. Radio set AN/GRC-9, which was furnished by the United States Army, can be supplied with power from a crank-driven generator. The operator in position reminded the Partisans

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of a man astride a donkey. Another version is that the name was adopted with reference to the nature of the beast -- sturdy, patient, enduring, but also quick, mean, and pugnacious. The Korean word for donkey, Tangnague, is used by the Donkeys as a radio call sign. In this connection it is also interesting to note that "Mounting a donkey was traditionally a privilege of Korean officials."[7] The other large formation of partisan units, whose sectors are on the east (right) of the Donkeys, are styled "Wolfpack."

Two Donkey organizations, Donkey 3 and Donkey 4, call themselves the "White Tigers." The tiger of Korean lore is rich in symbolism; among the virtues attributed to hi is courage. White also has special significance in this combination. It suggests, among others, qualities of spirituality and immortality. Both units share this nom de guerre because Donkey 3 shares Donkey 4's lineage. The latter's numerical designation in itself conveys challenge and defiance. Since the number four also denotes death to Koreans, they regard it as an unlucky number. Its use is accordingly much avoided. By adopting the number, Donkey 4 is expressing a spirit akin to that vaunted by the once noted European elite corps who wore the famed death's-head emblem.

As might be expected, their conduct in a fight and the factors affecting the state of their morale reflect both their own racial characteristics and those common to all fighting men of whatever breed. In combat their fire discipline is very good. All of the men participate in the fire fight and they open and maintain fire in obedience to orders. As a result the full fire power of the group can be applied, often with devastating results. Furthermore the excitement of combat may arouse a strong ardor for battle in individuals.

"Suicide" squads are found in some of the units. These are men who have volunteered to accept forlorn-hope missions regardless of the personal risk, including certain death. Such men can mark the difference between victory and disaster, because guerrillas, needing to carry off a raid with maximum speed and surprise effect, are in grave peril the

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moment they are locked into a drawn-out engagement. It is the suicide squad that deals with unforeseen strong points and the like. When his comrades were pinned down by a stubbornly-defended machine-gun bunker during a raid last summer, a member of such a squad simply jumped into the bunker with an ignited grenade in each hand, blowing up the NKPA crew along with himself. The resort to suicide to avoid capture has been noted elsewhere.

As might be expected, such a passionate and daring temperament can prove volatile. The partisans, of course, cannot expect to show the steadiness against sustained heavy attack that can be expected from better trained, armed, and disciplined regular troops. Their leaders understand this perfectly well, but enthusiasm may lead them into types of actions they are not well able to cope with.

A severe reversal can bring on despondency and gloom. Commanders are capable of blaming themselves quite unsparingly for the loss of too many of their "friends." One leader was clearly proud of his own record of losing only five of his men during a series of risky adventures in enemy territory.

When the morale of their men is lowered, the leaders use sound and time-tested remedies. A judicious combination of rest and work is as beneficial a stimulant for these North Koreans as it is for any other fighting man. The fighting ex-teacher who commands Donkey 11 told how he restored the spirits of men of his unit who had been driven off their islands with the loss of 30% of their comrades.

"By the time my people had lost Yongwi-do and the other three islands, they had been in cruel battles and many of my people had extremely broken hearts and also the feeling of fear. I had to send such people to Paengnyong-do or Taech'ong-do for a rest. When they had recovered from broken hearts and fatigue, I regrouped them on Kirin-do and gave them communication training and intelligence training."[8] About two months later they went back and reoccupied their islands.

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It means much to them to be provided with arms and equipment adequate to carrying out their jobs. This is true, naturally, with all soldiers. Special attentions, such as the issue of extra rations, sometimes work wonders. In fact supply is a vital factor in this campaign psychologically as well as materially.

It is said that the partisans fear death less than our troops do. It is probably true that they are more fatalistic, by and large, about death in battle. Yet it cannot be gainsaid that all human beings are afraid of dying, although different sets of values and different beliefs may modify or diminish such fears.

North Koreans have been more exposed to death in normal circumstances than we; at twelve years of age the life expectancy of a male inhabitant of Hwanghae-do was 45.58 years. A man who survived to the venerable, patriarchal age of sixty was something of a prodigy. Many of the years of their adult lives were years of tension, misery, and violence.

When a partisan is killed, any serviceable garments and equipment will be stripped from him for the sake of his comrades. There are no pensions or government life insurance or any manner of relief for widows and orphans. (Anyway, the families of most are behind the enemy's lines.) Indeed the futurehas little to offer them unless they win. They are not likely to return to Hwanghae-do and resume normal lives there so long as the Communists remain. A dreary outlook.

Consequently it is not surprising they are subject to attacks of dejection which take the form of an apathetic sense of (as they say) waiting. "Waiting" for the verdict of the future as to what will become of them. Where will they go if the peace settlement leaves their homes and families behind the 38th Parallel? But they have lived under a Communist regime; they hate it and they have scores to settle. Under the circumstances it is reasonable to expect a somewhat different attitude towards death.

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Following a successful large raid the partisan band may celebrate with a victory feast. First the returned raiders are questioned about details of the action, the enemy, the casualties inflicted, and so on. After the matters are disposed of, they hold their celebration. Many speeches are made and condolences for the dead are offered. At one of these affairs two oxen were roasted. The animals were probably captured and brought to the island base from the mainland.

The partisans do not depend entirely upon the US Army for supplies such as rations. Some items they want are not available through US sources. As mentioned elsewhere, a large shipment of rice goes out to Leopard Base each month, or in two installments a month. Rice is not only the foundation of the Korean ration but also serves, under these conditions, as a medium of exchange. The issue is based on an allowance of nine hops per man per day. Normally all men eat in a consolidated mess where five or six hops of rice is prepared for them. The remaining three or four hops are entrusted to the mess officer or someone appointed by the leader, to trade for side dishes. Side dishes include the various vegetables and spices -- cabbage, daikon, red peppers, garlic, peas, etc. -- as well as fish and meat. Out of these ingredients and some others a favorite native dish, kimchi, is prepared. In most cases the trading for side dishes is done at one of the larger cities some distance from the island because the quanity required cannot be supplied by the local merchants.

The ration allowance provides a diet of 800 grammes per man ie, less than two pounds (1 oz. = 28.35 grammes). The rice traded for side dishes mentioned above is in addition to 800 grammes. Hereabouts 600 grammes are considered ample diet for a man. Incidentally a hop is roughly a handful of rice. Leopard Base computes a 100-lb bag of rice as 288 hops. On this basis a hop is 5.5 ounces or the equivalent of just over half a pint of rice.

Since they are irregulars their rice ration represents their only pay. It might be interesting to compare it with the prevailing rates in some other occupations during the summer of 1952. A 100 lb bag of rice

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was quoted at 225,000 won on the port of Inchon blackmarket. A South Korean carpenter might receive twenty hops of rice a day (value 15,000 won). The writer's houseboy said, in July 1952, that he needed thirty liters of rice a month at 150,000 won. The blackmarket exchange rate was at least 9,000 won to the dollar (MPC), whereas the official rate was 6,000 won to the dollar (MPC). A lieutenant in the ROK Army was paid 35,000 won a month plus rations for himself and family which is not included in the normal Korean day wage pay scale.

The ration rice is delivered in bulk to the unit commander and he is responsible for issuing it to his men.

The units practice a system of small business dealings in order to improve their situation. These are handled by what might be called the unit welfare officer. Under his supervision the unit does a certain amount of fishing, farming and vegetable gardening. A man in Donkey 4 is skilled at diving for sea slugs. These creatures are regarded as delicacies and they generouly urged a platter of sea slug upon us at their parties. Fire wood is scarce on the islands and one unit, at least, cuts it on the mainland and brings it out for sale. It was rumored that one or two other enterprises were being managed under the nose of the enemy, but no proof was available.

Paper money is not much valued except for certain tranactions in North or South Korea which may require it. Agents, for instance, may need banknotes while in North Korea, and they are supplied by various means, including armed bank robbery. However, while North Korean paper money is said to be much more valuable than South Korean, it is reported to be extremely scarce. In fact Leopard Base wonders if very many people up there, including army officers, ever come into possession of it. It is not to be found in their pockets. Best sources are government offices and Communist Party bigwigs.

A source of revenue to the Partisans is the booty they capture. Under particularly favorable circumstances they have been able to bring out rice and other foodstuffs. A really prize catch is a good ox. The frequency with which oxen are captured and brought out is surprising.

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The animal is driven to the shore, a rope is fastened to his horns, and he is towed to an island behind a small boat. A good ox can be sold on the hoof at Inchon for about one million won (APPROXIMATELY $167 MPC). Otherwise he is put to work or butchered for his meat and hide.

Among other articles captured one notes a clock, a sewing machine, and a film projector! But a highly prized capture is a sampan or junk.

The principal means of transportation in the partisan war, whether for carrying men and supplies or for reconnaissance and raiding parties, is the native boat. The outfit that captures a boat keeps it. The Donkeys may man it with their own men, but sometimes the crew wished to work for the Donkeys who captured them. (This writer has suspected the possibility that some of these fishermen or seamen have deliberately put themselves in the way of being cpatured by these partisans.) A hired crew is paid in rice, the men bargaining for enough to feed their families as well as themselves. The contract crew on Leopard's junk, the Ark, are paid fifteen hops (about five pounds) per man per day.

When the supply of captured junks and sampans does not keep up with the demand, additional boats are hired on contract or purchased by the Donkeys. One good seaworthy boat, seventeen meters long, was quoted at an asking price of eighty million won. Berterwise, in round numbers, eighty prime oxen or over 350 100-lb. bags of rice. Of course any such transaction is marked by lively haggling, and the final price is a different matter. Most of these boats are deckless and clumsy looking. They are driven with large rectangular or triangular sails mounted on one-piece masts. A few are powered with simple marine engines. One leader wants a GMC marine engine; he would probably use it in his business after the war.

Much of the clothing, summer and winter, is supplied by the FEC Partisan Headquarters. Some articles are procured by the partisans. Although they often wear US Army footgear, they prefer tennis shoes or sneakers for fighting, and these they acquire with their own resources.

Medical stores are, of necessity, furnished by the FEC Command Post. The partisans do have some medical men among their number, as well as unit aid men. It is noteworthy that the partisans dislike going to a Korean hospital, civilian or military, so much so that they will often go to great lengths to avoid doing so.

There are some women with the partisans, mothers, wives, sisters, and others who were able to escape from the province. Some of them are practical nurses and all of them perform the usual occupations of women, sewing, cooking, and so on. A few can operate radios. But all these women are non-combatants. They do not fight. One might guess that there are woman agents serving the partisan cause, but that is another story.

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CITATIONS
(Part II)

1. See Narratives of Donkey 4, and Honor Guard Leader.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See Notes of Lt Col A. S. Daley.
5. See Narrative of Donkey 11.
6. See Narrative of Donkey 15.
7. Osgood, Cornelius, Korea And Its Culture.
8. See Narrative of Donkey 11.

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PART III
PARTISAN OPERATIONS

The purpose here is to deal with the types of operations of the United Nations North Korean Partisan Forces in Korea. It is not intended to represent this discussion as a paper on how to wage guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a category of the general subject of small wars, and from its definition and normal characteristics, certain principles may be deduced. At least some of the principles will be seen examplified here. But guerrilla warfare is by nature abnormal and unorthodox. It is difficult to fix in hard-and-fast rules an activity which depends to such a large extent on so many variable factors and which demands so much improvisation and resourcefulness. In short, "It is impossible to determine all the methods to be used in advance. The local features, people, ideas, social conditions, terrain, language, the enemy -- many factors, enter. What might have worked well at another time or place could prove useless or fatal here. Any account of one of these wars is valuable in connection with the principles rather than the exact means and methods. One of the best practical approaches is to seek out the old hands. They have been in the game, know their way around, know their enemy, and have valuable contacts. Hook up with them.[1] "

The only intention here, then, is to describe some of the tactics and techniques used in Korea. The doctrine held by certain partisan leaders is of interest and is touched on. More information can be gleaned from their interviews.

It should be pointed out that much of this material cannot be verified at the present time. Apart from the statements of the leaders, a main source is the file of operational summaries maintained by the Partisan Operations Division of the Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea)(FEC/LD(K)). These actions are briefly described on the basis of the partisans' reports. A few actions on the coasts were fought under the observation of UNC personnel. Most of the actions, however, occurred inland, beyond direct observation.

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The outcome of a quick hit-and-run attack, particularly the damage inflicted on the enemy, may have to wait on the reports of agents or members of the interior units. Often, it is said, casualty figures are gathered from carters, gravediggers, and others who have seen or handled corpses and the wounded, or have heard statements about the casualties.

G3 Eighth Army credits the partisan forces, assisted by the Air Force and Navy, with killing an estimated 5,450 enemy personnel, wounding 1,430, and capturing 6 during the period from 1 January to 14 February 1953. During the same period partisan losses were said to have totaled 110 killed, 152 wounded, and 78 missing.[2] A time of year more favorable to guerrilla activities should yield substantially higher results in casualties inflicted on the enemy.

Since the partisans operate from the island bases and enter Hwanghae-do from the sea, a discussion of the nature of the coasts is pertinent. The south coast, highly irregular and indented with peninsulas, inlets, spits, and headlands, trends northwestward one hundred miles to the tip of Changsan Peninsula. This peninsula, or cape, is the most westward ground thrust by the mainland into the Yellow Sea. It is an awkward shore to approach. For one thing the tides in this region of the Yellow Sea are among the highest known -- they reach twelve to thirty feet. Contrariwise, the Yellow Sea is unusually shallow. As the tide recedes, the nature of the coast is abruptly altered. Vast foreshore flats of sand or mud are uncovered as much as two or three miles out to the sea. During ebb tide it is possible at some places for a man to walk between island and mainshore. The islands here are numerous, and naturally they offer ideal bases for sea-borne guerrilla forays.

Among the islands, reefs, shoals, and detached banks, wind numerous twisting channels. Where the tide goes out through narrows, the channels are sometimes changed into turbulent rapids. Navigating a slow and clumsy sail boat through these waters is difficult, and operations must always be timed to take place during favorable weather and tidal

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conditions. The calendar of moon phases is a basic reference. Another obstacle to approaching some parts of the coast is the surf, which may reach a height of five feet.

Along this southern coast there are, speaking broadly, two kinds of beaches. Where alluvial glens and valleys descend to the sea a bay- or crescent-shaped beach is often found. The other is a long, narrow belt of beach found at the foot of the coastal hills and bluffs. On the average, five to twelve yards of beach lie above high-water level.

Steep hills front the Yellow Sea. They are covered with grass and occasional patches of scrub pine and other native vegetation. Here and there a hill reaches six or eight hundred or even a thousand meters. At the foot of the coastal hills there are rice fields and some wind up the valleys, away from the sea. Inland there are more hills and ridges. No main roads run along this shore. One railroad line, which has its western terminus at Ongjin, skirts the coast at a few points.

From the Changsan Cape the shores of Hwanghae-do Province trend generally northeast to the mouth of the Taedong River. While some of the coastal features already discussed are found along here, this coastal stretch has some features of its own. For one, the shore is less indented. Also there are fewer islands offshore; of them the principal is Ch'o-do.

An almost continuous sandy beach runs northeast from the cape for forty miles. The waters are shallow and flow and ebb along narrow drying foreshore flats. Long narrow shoals and detached banks lie offshore. Broad mud flats are filling the bays on the lip of the Taedong's estuary. Thus in some places the approaches are shallow and are exposed extensively or awash at low tide. In other places the beach is quite accessible, at least for craft of shallow draft. Where the beach is exposed to the west wind, a six-to ten-foot surf may present an ugly barrier. But the hills are not so high. On this stretch of the coast the highest point is Kwangsok-san, a mountain 410 meters above sea level. Seen across water, the Changsan-got looks rugged and formidable; there Kuksa-bong rises 284

meters above the sea. [redacted]

It would be difficult to seal such a coast line against penetration by seaborne guerrillas. They do suffer occasional disasters, but more often than not agents and partisans slip in and out unapprehended. Some parties -- interior units -- remain inland for periods of time, conducting their activities from a secret base. The hill and mountain districts provide classic guerrilla hideouts. There are also safe houses for temporary shelter in populous places.

The leaders of the partisans, that is the North Korean leaders, are not unsophisticated in their approach to guerrilla tactics. Various individuals have evolved guiding theories, as the reader of certain of their interviews will note, and it is clear that much of their thinking is based on experience. "We guerrillas had no theory but we have had experience which is most important for us. In the experience we found the theory...[3]" It is not so clear whether they have an academic, textbook knowledge of the the principles of guerrilla tactics. The fact that they have come up with conclusions parallel with doctrines taught by well-known students of the subject, men like Col T. E. Lawrence or Marshal Mao Tze Tung, is not at all decisive. For one thing most of these parallel conclusions have to do with the more obvious aspects of guerrilla fighting. However, one leader used a metaphorical axiom, "The saying is, 'you make the noise in the east and hit the enemy in the west!'"[4] It would not be surprising if some of them had read Mao or become acquainted indirectly with his or similiar writings.

Broadly speaking, the leaders who talked about guerrilla tactics stressed certain features and factors. They recognized important differences, both physically and psychologically between regular army formations and guerrilla formations. On the physical side they credit the regular military unit with possessing superior weapons and powers of cohesion under pressure. In short the conventional troop unit in force can support and sustain attack and defense to a point beyond the present

powers of the guerrillas. It is particularly in the defense of a position that this disparity is most easily seen.

Therefore the commander of Donkey 4 insists on the importance of surprise, which lifts the contest from the realm of the physical to the realm of the psychological. "It is the theory of guerrillas that there is nothing but surprise, which is the principle that they follow.... I repeat, surprise is the whole of guerrilla warfare."[5] Guerrillas surprise the enemy by making a virtue of weakness and mutability. Unfettered by lines of communications, fixed bases, and heavy equipment, they can come and go at will, an "invisible" force. The ideal is to appear suddenly with explosive violence, like a shell, and then disappear as quickly in, as it were, their own smoke.

It is necessary for the guerrilla to respect the old doctrine of being superior at the critical point at the time of the attack. The guerrilla must be certain of being able to confront his enemy unexpectedly, deal him a quick and hurtful blow, and take himself off without delay. In a sense, the guerrilla never properly attacks a tactical objective--he attacks a victim, whether the victim be a sentry or rice granary. In order to arrange these circumstances, the guerrilla should have an excellent system for getting information. "Therefore," as the leader said, "guerrilla intelligence is next to the vital thing."[6]

Surprise is gained by a mixture of speed, violence, and shock; it is maintained by applying strength against weakness; it is protected by refusing to meet the enemy's reserve and avoiding a decision. Consequently, the task of a guerrilla party is by rights strictly limited. Except for certain special operations, the guerrilla party itself is necessarily quite small. More than a dozen or fifteen men might be considered in the situation now prevailing as a large force. More men tend to sacrifice speed and "invisibility" and multiply the difficulties of living off the country and maintaining security without compensatory advantage.

"The most difficult thing for guerrilla forces is to defend and

hold ground. The easiest thing for guerrillas is to attack," said the commander of Donkey 15.[7]

The aims of classic guerrilla operations do not necessarily have to do with killing the enemy. The enemy has an abundance of men, the partisans do not. But killing North Korean and Chinese Communist troops does have a number of purposes. The corpses remind the populace that there is a resistance in their midst. At the same time the constant threat of sudden death meted out by an almost silent adversary evidently encumbers the enemy with all the various measures of security and precaution. And in one respect he may be peculiarly vulnerable. The death of a specialist, a technician, an officer, or a Communist official must often leave a gap that is not easily filled with a qualified replacement. The loss of these sorts of people must injure the apparatus of control and communication in the province. The Communist officials and agents themselves represent a kind of political line of communications.

This would be particularly so in ideological warfare. It is on the stage of conflict of ideas that partisan activities play a large part, and always have. The partisan activities spell rebellion and are evidence that the issue is by no means settled. They are proof of a wide-spread sympathy among the people, even if it is latent or passive. Indeed, in other conflicts details of such dissidence have been widely publicized and much benefit thought to have been gained for the cause by the propaganda.

Guerrillas have always had the means, if wisely used, of forcing the enemy to employ excessive numbers of his men to protect the communications and so on. It is the intent to burden the enemy with this thankless and unremunerative job here. So far as the Hwanghae-do region goes, the relative absence of highly vulnerable arteries of supply might seem, at first glance, to ease his problem. However, he also has an open sea frontier on this flank and he cannot risk turning his back on it. An officer of the Liaison Detachment sums up this situation very concretely as it applies to North Korea.

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" 'The enemy is incapable of securing completely his rear, to include the coastline.' This statement can be said to be true in almost any military situation, but is particularly true in Korea which, although bounded on the north by the natural and agreed-upon boundary of the Yalu River, has an extremely irregular coastline and unusually rugged interior physiography. The number of regular troops necessary to completely protect North Korea from infiltration by organized and determined indigenous partisan forces is estimated at from fifteen to twenty times the strength of partisan forces large enough to provoke a campaign of suppression. A partisan strength of 25,000, well-led and properly trained, could be expected to divert from 375,000 to 500,000 regular troops from other duties necessary to a successful prosecution of the war." [8]

The practical effect of partisan operations, combined with other UNC potentialities, is to modify the enemy's offensive capabilities. "The enemy is faced at this time with a much greater threat to his rear area than was present before the Fifth Phase offensive. The guerrilla forces, of which he is well aware, plus the threat of airborne and amphibious counter-offensives, dictates that he maintain adequate defense troop elements throughout his rear area. " [9]

The infliction of damage on the enemy's supply system, installations, and economy normally implies an extensive use of sabotage. However, Hwanghae-do Province is not industrialized and the main supply effort is generally well inland, being oriented towards the main battle line. Sabotage is largely concerned with attempts to damage or destroy bridges and culverts, telephone lines, and similar means of communication. Objectives also include the food-processing factories and granaries and warehouses.

Attempts to sabotage rail lines and equipment do not appear to have been fruitful during the period under consideration. Railroad lines are not only quite far inland, but also they are, it is said, quite heavily defended. There is no evidence of important damage to a train or locomotive in the sector. The effective use of explosives to cut rails and damage bridges requires an amount of skill not found among the partisans. Demolition men had to be trained, and most of them still have much to learn.[10] It is the Air Force that carries out attacks on rail lines. At this stage a more useful role for the partisans

is the location of targets for the Air Force and naval ships.

Hwanghae-do Province is a principal source of staple food crops in North Korea. It is a matter of consequence to the enemy that the rice and other crops be cultivated and harvested. In some regions farming battalions have the mission of tending and protecting the crops. Many civilian officials are occupied with the management and supervision of agricultural production. The government takes a grain levy, called the spot tax, which is an important source of food stuff for North Korea.

The derangement of the grain-collecting system is a worthy objective for partisans. Their attempts range from burning the grain to destroying records and otherwise harassing the agencies. As a standing crop wet rice is not easily harmed; it is more liable to be damaged after it is reaped. Oxen figure in these attacks on the agricultural economy. This animal is widely used in the paddies for plowing, cultivating, and hauling. They also turn the stone in the primitive village grist mill and serve as general draft animals. The loss of oxen greatly increases the burden of farm labor. Furthermore they are valuable booty. Hence the partisans try to capture them. When it is possible, they are towed behind a boat to an island base. One leader said that in the early days they had scruples about taking oxen, but they settled their qualms on a quantitative basis. "Also there were 300 head of oxen on the island. Until that time we were not sure whether it was legal or illegal to capture enemy oxen, even though we were partisans, so we just captured twenty oxen."[11]

The Liaison Detachment has since issued instructions on this subject. "Continuing efforts will be made to capture enemy oxen and other cattle. These cattle offer a source of fresh meat for partisans and deny oxcart transport to the enemy. Also, with the anticipated food shortage in North Korea during 1952, shortage of oxen will hamper farm production as the enemy has insufficient tractors. Oxen still remain a good trade item in South Korea and can be used for trading for side

dishes. Commanders will authorize the Guerrillas to trade excess liberated cattle for items required."[12]

A similer principle of living off the enemy as much as possible applies to rice and other foodstuffs. "Any supplies that can be denied the enemy will further the war effort. Stress with your Guerrilla Leaders that if they cannot evacuate enemy supplies and if they cannot be given to loyal civilian supporters, that the supplies are to be destroyed."[13]

Many attacks are designed to disrupt the supply of food and other necessities of life. On 27 August 1952, partisans captured nine oxcart loads of food, weapons, and ammunition being driven to an enemy company CP. The intention was to drive the carts to a safe place, but as it turned out there was not enough time to manage it. The standard practice was consequently resorted to, the booty being drenched with gasoline and set afire. The raiders made off with the oxen. There is a contemporary report of an attack on two cart loads of lumber. During the same month, reservoir flood gates were blown up and the water released damaged a crop of rice estimated at 1,000 bags. During June, July, and August 1952, the partisans destroyed granaries, food warehouses, a rice cleaning mill, and salt works. Also during that summer a Consumption Association Office was raided and 187,900 Whan confiscated.[14]

The Communists appear to have a rather elaborate organization for handling food stuffs and managing agricultural pursuits in general. The offices and office records have been attacked and destroyed. In August 1952, for example, the office of an "experimental" farm was burned.[15] Communist rice collectors (i.e., the "spot tax" men) are frequent victims as accounts in the interviews and many operations report will testify. The rice collectors -- traditionally unloved -- work under the protection of North Korean troops and the local Communist militiamen, the "Self Guard" troops. In connection with the latter, it should be noted that a number of the many Communist organizations and associations are quasi-military. They are natural and perhaps favorite targets of the partisans.

On the evening of 22 March 1953 there was a meeting of an Agricultural Association. Five partisans disguised as North Korean soldiers attended the meeting while thirty-two others posted themselves around the building. The partisans at the meeting surreptitiously planted hand grenades and charges of TNT and then slipped out. The explosions threw the survivors into a panic and as they fled from the building many of them were shot down by the waiting partisans. The partisans claimed to have killed one NKPA soldier and 31 "quasi-military persons," most of them presemably members of the Agricultural Association. One partisan was reported wounded.[16]

Raids on gatherings of various natures appear to be a specialty of the partisans, just as holding such affairs appears to be a specialty of the Communists. In August 1952 a group reported closing in on a garden party, "ending abruptly all revelry." Out of thirty-five Korean military men, twenty-seven were claimed killed.[17] During the same month a Communist Party meeting and a conference at a People's Committee Office were shot up. Another interesting example of these tactics of harassment occurred in March 1953 when two partisans dressed in civilian clothes proved unsociable guests at a Communist meeting. They contrived to set a charge of TNT and an antitank mine, both with delay-type fuses. Then they left the meeting. Partisan agents reported that in the ensuing explosion, which shattered the building, thirty-one quasi-military persons were killed and eleven were wounded.[18]

During the same month two companies of soldiers were attacked while watching troop show entertainers. Fifty partisans moved in, killed the guards, and then fired rifle grenades into the audience. Agent reports placed the toll at thirty NKPA troops killed and twenty-one wounded. Weapons and oxen were captured. Five of the partisans were killed.[19] Other such exploits were carried out in March 1953. Eight interior-unit partisans of the 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment "attended" a party given by Communists for North Korean policemen. The party was

suddenly turned into a shambles. At the same time it was reported that members of the 2d Partisan Infantry Regiment discovered an enemy group at a show. The laconic summary of the action: "broke up the show."[20]

Troops sleeping in billets and towns are vulnerable to well-planned guerrilla action, and such attacks are frequent enough to deserve mention as a feature of partisan enterprises. Small units, such as a platoon, have been struck at in the night in a hit-and-run raid. On such occasions hand grenades are particularly effective. The billeting areas of large units have been identified for air strikes, sometimes with considerable detail, by radio. This is another instance of the use of the partisans to set up targets for more powerfully hitting units.

Memorial meetings marked the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953. Such a meeting on 9 March, said to have been attended by 180 Communists and sympathizers, was infiltrated by thirty-eight partisans dressed like farmers. They reported that they "disrupted" the affair with TNT, grenades, and small arms. Another Stalin memorial ceremony was interrupted with violence during the period of silence.[21]

From time to time buildings are mined to discourage the activities which they house. Oral accounts of these feats would suggest a good deal of resourcefulness and daring on the part of the agents concerned. Command posts, Communist Party training schools, conference rooms and police installations and the like have suffered these explosions, often with considerable casualties. Here is a recent example. Partisans of an interior unit got jobs working in a mess hall. They planted charges of TNT and C-3 under the floor. Four other partisans planted charges of TNT and C-3 in the billets. All the charges were armed with time fuses. Those in the mess hall were detonated during the evening meal. Then, at 2300, explosions in the billets followed. Agents reported that ninety North Korean soldiers were killed and five buildings were destroyed. The exploit cost the partisans one killed and one wounded.[22] There are also stories about more elementary tricks, such as planting

an antitank mine in a stove.

The partisans have developed a bag of tricks. Two partisans of an interior unit, dressed in civilian clothes, boarded an enemy sail junk bound for Chinamp'o. A number of NKPA troops and irregulars were aboard. At a sufficient distance from the shore, the partisans suddenly dropped hand grenades which they had concealed about them and quickly jumped overboard. They claimed that the junk sank and nine soldiers and seven of the quasi-military men perished. The partisans swam ashore and got off without hurt.[23]

Ruses are numerous and often very ingenious in a malicious kind of way. On the evening of 30 March 1953 three partisans uniformed as NKPA soldiers went to a meeting place of a Ri Peoples' Committee. On the pretext of some business or other they induced the leader to step outside where they quickly disposed of him and departed.[24] A study of these operations will bring to light refinements on certain ruses. One of these ruses involves decoying the victims into a previously prepared mine field. This can lead to very effective results and must be extremely demoralizing. Like an elaborate practical joke it has to be planned, and it is set up beforehand near a post or garrison. In one of the earlier efforts the partisans laid mines on a hillside. After dark they lighted a conspicuous bonfire on the hill top and then went away to await developments. A North Korean commander in the vicinity decided to investigate the suspicious fire. His patrol stumbled into the mine field and lost nine killed and four wounded. Further refinements on this deception brought a rather spectacular climax in February 1953. "Twenty-one partisans planted antitank and anti-personnel mines on a hill and then clandestinely issued an operational order directing enemy forces to attack the hill. NKA troops accepted the spurious order and suffered eighty-two killed, twelve wounded, and the loss of one heavy machine gun. No casualties were sustained by the partisans in this action."[25]

Mines are sometimes used in a similar manner in connection with an

actual partisan attack. "Attacking on information from agents, partisans surrounded a CP in North Korea, placed AP mines and TNT in likely avenues of escape, and then attacked. Enemy troops attempting to escape were driven into the mines by partisan fire. Three BAR's covering the mine field then opened fire inflicting casualties of thirty-one NKA killed and eleven wounded. In addition, two Russian trucks and 300 cases of ammunition were destroyed. Three partisans were wounded in the action."[26]

An interesting account of the employment of ruses to deceive the enemy about the armament of partisans attacking him is recounted by the leader of the Partisan Honor Guard, see his narrative.

In attacks both of calculation and opportunity, the partisans have struck at a variety of enemy equipment and installations. These include artillery pieces, fire fighting equipment, vehicles, and military and police installations. Ambushes of vehicles as well as personnel have been staged. Junks and other craft have been captured or destroyed on shore and at sea. In August 1952 partisans captured the pilot of a downed MIG-15, burned the plane, and fought their way out of the area.[27] On another occasion, a captured US medium tank was destroyed by the partisans at the cost of one killed and two wounded.[28]

Partisans also act as spotters for air and navy operations. They furnish information on likely targets and sometimes observe and assess results. (See congratulatory radio, HMS Ocean to Headquarters, Operation Leopard, page 7.) In July 1952 partisans set up and observed the night bombing of an NKPA battalion at Changyon. They reported that 278 enemy troops were killed.[29] One advantage they have is the ability to detect concealed and camouflaged targets that might otherwise be overlooked. A minor but revealing case was their discovery of small boats hidden under a bridge and camouflaged with sand and seaweed.[30]

There is another major enterprise in addition to the typical guerrilla exploits of harassment and sabotage. This is the raid on the coasts supported by air and naval elements. A favorable objective having

been chosen, such a raid is carefully planned and timed to take advantage of favorable moon and tide phases. They are the most elaborate combat actions of the partisans. The purposes of these raids include the destruction of coastal defenses, reconnaissance in force, and the infliction of casualties by forcing enemy troops into the open where they can be hit by air bombardment and ship's fire..

There are accounts of these raids in the operational reports. One which occurred in the summer of 1952 and which was recommended by Leopard Base as quite typical was described by 1st Lt Ben Malcolm. It is customary for one or more Americans to accompany the partisans on these raids. They maintain radio contact with the supporting air and naval elements. During this action the commander of Operation Leopard, Major Thomas A. Dye, was aboard a warship, just off shore. Lieutenant Malcolm called targets to Major Dye, using an SCR-300. The ship in turn relayed the information to the airplanes. According to Lieutenant Malcolm, this action was planned for about five days. The objective was hostile coastal defenses organized around bunkers garrisoned by a machine-gun platoon. It was supported by reserves farther inland.[31]

Previously the positions were reconnoitered by partisan agents. Through prearranged signals (in this case a small charge of TNT was set off), the agents were called to a rendezvous on the beach and brought out to Wollae-do. There a map was prepared showing the positions, and detailed instructions were developed. According to Malcolm, aerial photographs were never available. On the appointed day, the raiding party left the island in five sailing junks to land about 2300 that night. An eight-man beach patrol went ahead to make certain the way was clear for landing.[32]

The raiders wore caps, which they prefer to noisy helmets, tied their trousers' cuffs over their tennis shoes and made sure white T-shirts and the like were not showing. Squad leaders inspected their dress, ammunition, and weapons before they embarked. The lieutenant was required to prepare himself in exactly the same way. The raiders

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were armed with rifles and grenades. They carried a 60-mm mortar and between thirty-five and fifty rounds. They dispensed with the base plate.[33]

Moving stealthily and silently, the whole party proceeded inland, under the noses of sentries, from about 0030, when they were organized on the beach, until about 0300. By 0445 they were in position and the UN ship knocked out a Chinese gun. Air targets had also been prearranged. As the fighting developed, so did targets of opportunity -- two enemy groups of fifty and seventy-five men and the location of the Chinese battalion command post. Aircraft were brought in on these targets. During the action a member of the suicide squad sacrificed himself to knock out a stubbornly resisting machine-gun bunker. In this action, which was considered highly successful, the partisans lost six killed and seven wounded. According to Lieutenant Malcolm, the dead were stripped and left and the wounded were brought out.[34]

When the raiding party returned to the island, a debriefing was held. After that there were speeches, including condolences for the dead, and a victory feast was celebrated.[35]

These large raids, involving one or two hundred men, involve the risk of severe casualties. Some officers believe they are too risky. Here is an account of a more recent raid.

"On 292000 I Mar. 113 partisans of the 7th Bn landed on the island of Chopto (XC7159) to prepare for an attack on enemy battalion and company CP's at XC778588, on the mainland. Seventeen (17) partisans remained on Chopto to cover the friendlies' line of withdrawal and at 310120 I Mar, the attacking partisans surrounded the CP's. The partisans attacked at first light of day, completely surprising the enemy. The friendlies withdrew to Chopto after inflicting severe damage to the enemy and capturing one (1) major and (1) sergeant. While waiting for boats from Chodo (XC6066) to pick them up, the friendlies were counterattacked by an estimated 250 NKA. The partisans engaged the enemy and called for air and naval support at 311600 I Mar. Both air and naval support arrived at 311630 I Mar. and began their attack on the enemy, allowing the friendlies to withdraw to Chodo. The prisoners were killed during the counterattack. Total results from partisan action: sixty-five (65) NKA killed; 20 NKA wounded; five (5) PPSH's, one (1) Russian pistol, 67 rounds of ammunition, and two (2) uniforms captured. Results of air and navy action: one hundred thirteen (113) NKA killed and 31 NKA wounded. Friendly losses consisted of four (4) KIA, two (2) WIA, and one (1) junk damaged." [36]

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Other accounts of large actions, offensive and defensive, are found in the narratives by the leaders.

The partisans also engage in intelligence activities, but the techniques and the apparatus was thought too sensitive to be disclosed at this time. There were indications in some quarters of skepticism about the efficiency of partisan intelligence work and some other sides of the operations. A statement of this criticism has been included among the supporting documents.[37]

CITATIONS
(Part III)

1. Stated by Col Washington M. Ives, Commanding Officer, Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities in Korea (CCRAK), in conversation with Lt Col A. S. Daley and Maj B. C. Mossman on 29 Sep 52.

2. GX2713, KGO-0, Special Weekly Operations Report Number 19 (RCS YGC-37), Period 230001 February - 012400 March 1953, Part 3.

3. See Narrative of Donkey 4.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. See Narrative of Donkey 15.

8. Ltr, Hq Second Partisan Infantry Regiment, FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, APO 301, Subj: Questionnaire, Project MHD-3, dtd 16 Mar 53.

9. From Periodic Intelligence Report No. 1044, Hq Eighth Army, APO 301, 21 May 53, Incl 5, par 3, p. 3. (Not included.)

10. Ltr, Hq Operation Leopard, APO 301, Subj: Letter of Instruction, dtd 15 Mar 52, par 3e.

11. See Narrative of Donkey 15.

12. Ltr, Hq FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU, subj: Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1952, dtd 11 Apr 52, par 16, p. 4.

13. Ibid., par 2, p. 1.

14. See Extracts of FEC/LD (K) OPSUMs.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., (OPSUM #60, 1 Apr 53).

17. Ibid., (OPSUM #526, 26 Aug 52).

18. Ibid., (OPSUM #50, 22 Mar 53).

19. Ibid., (OPSUM #58, 30 Mar 53).

20. Ibid., (OPSUM #59, 31 Mar 53).

21. Ibid., (OPSUMs #43, 15 Mar 53 and #48, 20 Mar 53).

22. Ibid., (OPSUM #49, 21 Mar 53).

23. Ibid., (OPSUM #54, 26 Mar 53).

24. Ibid., (OPSUM #62, 3 Apr 53).

25. GX2713, KGO-O, Special Weekly Operations Report Number 19 (RCS YGC-37), Period 230001 February - 012400 March 1953, Part 3.

26. Ibid.

27. See Extracts of FEC/LD (K) OPSUMs (OPSUM #403, 5 Aug 52).

28. Ibid., (OPSUM #361, 30 Jul 52).

29. Ibid., (OPSUM #374, 21 Jul 52).

30. Ibid., (OPSUM #230, 29 May 52).

31. Interview with 1st Lt Ben Malcolm, S2, Operation Leopard, 9 Oct 52.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. See Extracts of FEC/LD (K) OPSUMs (OPSUM #64, 5 Apr 53).

37. Interview with Lt Col Francis R. Purcell, 01324115, G2 Section, Hq Eighth Army, 13 May 53.

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PART IV

NARRATIVES OF PARTISAN LEADERS

Introduction

On the foregoing pages of this report frequent reference to statements by partisan leaders has been made. Below are the interviews from which those statements were taken, presented as a part of the narrative rather than as supporting documents. Each is an individual narrative which summarizes the background, motivation, theories, methods, and accomplishments of a leader and his followers. Close study will permit the reader further insight of these people who lead irregular forces against Communist aggression in Korea.

[redacted]

THE NARRATIVE OF THE LEADER OF DONKEY 1, MR CHANG JAE HWA[1]

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[1]Mr. Chang Jae Hwa was interviewed by Lt Col A. S. Daley and Maj B. C. Mossman, 041000 Nov 1952, on a western coastal island. The interpreter was Lieutenant Cho Byung Chan, ROKA, of Chungju, South Korea.

I finished Yong-chin High School in Choryong, Hwang-hae-do during the Japanese regime in Korea. After 1945, 15 August, and until 13 October 1950, I had been a merchant business man. On 13 October 1950 the UN forces had advanced to my own area which was Shin-chon, we had liberated our home town from the Communist hands. After fighting them as a member of an armed force while the UN forces were occupying North Korea, I had then become a policeman in my home town. The police corps should rather be called Security Forces co-operating with UN occupying forces. We evacuated our home area on 6 December 1950 when the Communists invaded our home area again.

We came out to the island Paengnyong-do, and on 5 January 1951 I had joined the intelligence corps of the ROK Navy and had worked with them until 15 February 1951, when the Leopard headquarters started organizing Donkey units. On 15 February 1951, I became leader of Donkey 1. The commanding officer of Leopard base at that time was Lieutenant Harrison. He was the first commanding officer of Leopard base. Besides him, there were two officers helping Lieutenant Harrison; one was S-3, the other was communications officer. We had been training for fifteen days. The training was demolitions and communications training.

On 3 March 1951 we were first sent to the mainland with radio for the purpose of obtaining information of the enemy in the neighborhood of Shin-chon, Sari-won, and Hwang-ju. We went to Shin-chon by way of Pulta-san. We had been in contact with the headquarters on Paengnyong-do for a week. However, our radio was broken because sometimes we fell

off the cliffs, snow-covered hillsides, and river banks. Just before our radio was broken, we sent a message to the Command Post that there were so many CCF punitive forces on the mainland that we wanted to return to base and the broken radio was another reason why we wanted to return and to come back to the mainland again when we were ready. Then the Command Post sent a message back to us saying we should stay in hiding on the mainland because the Command Post was going to send more units like ours to the mainland. Therefore we were to wait until they arrived in our area. We buried our broken radio in the ground on the top of a hill, and we started operating as partisans without having contact with headquarters.

I would like to add this information: The first strength I took to the mainland was thirty-seven men. That was on 3 March 1951. Without having any radio contact with headquarters, we gathered the loyal youth on the mainland, as well as former members of the security force who were straggling in the mountainous area. The first attack was made by our force, strenghened by the people who were rescued by us, on an enemy police station detachment at Bu-chong-ni, Nam-bu-myon, approximately four kilometers from Chong-bong-san. We killed seven policemen and one North Korean gun representative for the National Assembly and other local Communists, such as propagandists, inspectors, and other administrative officials -- a total of twenty-seven were killed in that action.

There was a friend of mine named Kim Chang Gun who could not get out of Shin-chon, which is my home town, and who was staying in Shin-chon as a technician at the Shin-chon Automobile Station. On or about 3 April 1951, I met this friend and he told me that there were about ten army buses in the Shin-chon Automobile Station. When we left the island we had received some demolition (composition C-3) and we used this to destroy three of the ten army buses in the Automobile Station. This friend, Kim Chong Gun, who was CQ of the night at the Automobile Station and who gave the information on the army buses, was tried by a so-called

Peoples' Trial and he was shot because he was found responsible.

On or about 18 April 1951, we assaulted four enemy warehouses where they used to keep the spot-tax grain. At that time there were approximately seventeen or eighteen hundred people detained in those warehouses. They were the former members of the police station detachment under the UN forces and members of the security forces and the families of them and the families of us guerrillas, and the NKA were guarding those warehouses. Therefore sixty of us assaulted those warehouses. Four hundred of those people escaped from the warehouses when we opened the doors; the rest of the people were so weakened from being without food for a long time that they could not even move. In that assault I lost fifty of my men.

Mr Moon Hung Jyu and Mr Cha Hyon Moo were among the thirty-seven people whom I took from this island as Donkey 1. The others, the people who joined on the mainland, I cannot remember. While the four hundred prisoners were escaping from those warehouses and we were evacuating the area as enemy reinforcements came, the rest, the 1300 sick and starved who were unable to flee from those warehouses, were almost all killed by enemy machine guns! This was the slaughter by the enemy that day.

Then we attacked enemy police detachments, capturing one member of the Central Communist Assembly, and we attacked warehouses. Finally the enemy had started mopping-up operations on a large scale and all over the area of Shin-chon, where two thousand CCF troops were stationed for that purpose. We had inevitably moved to Chi-nam-san, approximately eight kilometers south of Pal-bong-san, and also it became almost impossible for us to operate in a group of large nembers. It was also difficult to be staying in any one place with all of my people. Therefore I divided my people into several parties of five or ten men and one party, I sent to the An-nak area. Some other parties were sent to Chae-ryong. Some other parties were also sent to Hwang-ju for the purpose of obtaining information of the enemy and destroying his installations. Some of them eventually returned to my guerrilla base, some of them did not.

Also on or about 11 May 1951, we attacked an enemy-operated mine which was located in Sam-chon Hot Springs, approximately twelve kilometers west of Shin-chon. About eight hundred friendly civilians had been mobilized to work in the mine. The mineral which the mine was digging was mo-na-ji.* On the night of 11 May 1951, we supprised the

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*EDITOR'S NOTE: Monazite. There have been reports of the shipment of this ore, to an undisclosed destination in the U.S.S.R., from active monazite mines and deposits in North Korea. See EUSAK G2 special staff report, August 1952, narrative, p. 7.

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quarters of these civilian laborers and we threatened the people in the quarters by firing our rifles. The guards who were guarding those civilian laborers escaped. The civilian laborers also escaped from the mine. It was our purpose to let the civilian laborers escape from the mine.

Also about thattime we attacked Ul-lung-san, approximately four kilometers north of Shin-chon. There were about eight hundred bags of grain confiscated from the civilians at that place under the name of spot-tax material. We destroyed almost all of the grain, using bottles filled with gasoline.

About a month and a half ago a friend of mine returned from the mainland. His name is Kim Yong Hi. He was a leader of one of the groups which I sent to the area of An-nak last year. For all those months he had been obtaining information on the mainland and now he furnished the Command Post with much valuable information.

About three months ago there returned another friend of mine named Hong Tae Won, who was a leader of one of the groups that I sent to Hwang-ju area. When he returned from the mainland about three months ago, I found that one of his eyes had been lost because of the wound suffered when enemy punitive forces attacked them. Mr Hong was first sent to Hwang-ju; he had much valuable information about enemy headquarters, complete sketches of Hwang-ju and where the enemy base of transportation

[redacted] was in Pyongyang, Taedong-gang area. He was for a time a dock laborer along the Taedong-gang. All those people had been regarded as killed! However they are now with me again as members of Donkey 1.

Mr Ha Yong Chae was the leader of the group that was sent to Chae-ryong. The people in that group were almost all killed by the enemy when they were discovered on the way to Kum-san mine, approximately six kilometers east of Chae-ryong, with TNT and blasting caps. There was no way they could escape from the enemy bullets. Thus the Chae-ryong group was completely destroyed.

While we were operating on the mainland naturally we had much information of the enemy there which would have been quite valuable to this Command Post. However, we could not send that information of the enemy to this Command Post because of lacking radio contact. It would take volumes to state what we had done on the mainland! We killed approximately 280 local Communists, villainous Communists' families of NK Army soldiers during the period of time after we landed on the mainland. When we left the mainland, we had cut many railroad tracks, enemy telephone wires in many places, and destroyed enemy offices. What we had done on the mainland could not be stated now in detail.

On 23 July 1951, I finally could find a chance to get out of the mainland to Yuk-to, which was a Donkey 4 base.

When I returned to this island, Paengnyong-do, Colonel Burke instead of Lt Harrison, who had been CO of the base when I left, was the commanding officer. Then due to the situation of this CP and the operation area, I was told to be an intelligence unit under the Command Post and on 26 August 1951, I was sent to Yong-ho-do as a small intelligence unit under this Command Post.

As an intelligence unit of this Command Post, I had a complete agent net set up on the mainland. One line went to Chae-ryong and the other went to An-nak, and another line went to Shin-chon, and one more line went to Hwang-ju area. Through this agent route and net set up I

succeeded in obtaining numerous information of the enemy.

On or about 27 September 1951, there was one enemy fort, which was actually a pill box, in our agents' way. At this enemy fort there was one NKA platoon equipped with heavy machine guns, light machine guns, rifles, and a telephone. The pill box was a great threat to our agents. Finally we organized a suicide squad of fifteen men with which we assaulted the enemy fort. There we captured one .50-caliber machine gun, three light machine guns, caliber .30, PPSHs, and Russian rifles as well as enemy telephone sets, and killed about thirty men of the platoon. It was one of the glorious battles we had fought on Yong-ho-do.

Mr Hong Tae Hwan, who had returned about three months before from the Pyongyang area, succeeded to induce one enemy communications staff officer with one middle star (major) into surrendering to us. This communications officer furnished us for the first time with information on enemy radar stations in North Korea as well as on communications nets in North Korea. Also from him we received a lot of information on the whole picture of Kim Il Sung's headquarters as well as Sung's private quarters.

In the first part of October 1951, we attacked an enemy position in Sudae-san, four kilometers west of Ongjin and on that raid we captured one enemy rocket launcher, 3.5", and a lot of ammunition for anti-tank guns and direct-fire guns, as well as rifle grenades.

On or about 27 October 1951, we attacked four enemy oxcarts fully loaded with medical supplies to be sent to the Ongjin Peoples' Hospital. The place where we attacked was Kang-yong, which is located between Haeju and Ongjin, and the oxcarts were coming from Haeju. We captured all the medical supplies as well as all four oxcarts. Also we captured one surgeon and one assistant surgeon alive. The medical supplies that we captured were worth 70 million South Korean won.

There are many more war stories that I would like to give you.

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However, it would take too long a time, so I would like to give you the story how the island of Yong-ho-do fell into enemy hands. During the period of 26 August to the end of December 1951 in our guerrilla operations from Yong-ho-do we had killed a little over nine hundred NKAs and Communists. On 27 December 1951, we had information that twenty-seven enemy boats, including some rubber boats, were concentrated on an enemy-held beach about two kilometers from Yong-ho-do, in order to attack. We were told from the Command Post not to stay, but to withdraw from Yong-ho-do, when we sent this information to the Command Post. Donkey 11, which was one of the two Donkeys on Yong-ho-do, had then withdrawn from Yong-ho-do, but we stayed on Yong-ho-do because we could not leave so many friendly civilians, who were staying on Yong-ho-do, to the red devils, and for four days we had all friendly civilians evacuated from Yong-ho-do. At approximately 0600 on 1 January 1952, overwhelming enemy troops had finally landed at Yong-ho-do. One of the most serious and desperate battles then took place, starting at 0730 hours on 1 January 1952. We had eight friendly airplanes supporting our ground battle and we fought the enemy on Yong-ho-do until 1530 hours. In that action thirty-two friendlies were killed and forty friendlies were seriously wounded.

Sun-wi-do, Oh-wa-do, Chang-lin-do had fallen into enemy hands and we moved to Ki-rin-do. On or about 3 February 1952, with Donkey 11 unit, we retook Chang-lin-do, Oh-wa-do and Sun-wi-do.

While we were staying on Ki-rin-do, Chang-lin-do, which was being defended by Donkey 11, was invaded by the enemy last summer (June or July, 1952). We sent reinforcements to Chang-lin-do to help Donkey 11 to fight. We captured six NKA alive in that action.

Since M/Sgt Donald Meeks had come to my unit as advisor, we have had several big operations. On or about 20 September 1952, we attacked enemy troops located at Shijol-gol. On that raid we captured eleven

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enemy alive and killed a little more than 150 enemy. Sgt Meeks had personally participated in the operation.

On 29 October 1952, we attacked the enemy in Buong-mol. On that raid approximately two hundred friendlies were used. Sergeant Meeks who is our advisor, was at the head of our front unit. Capt Donald A. Seibert, Operations Officer of Leopard Command Post, and his interpreter, Mr Liu, and myself, were at the Command Post which was also on the mainland. This last operation was one of the severest and most confused battles. The fire fighting had started from 0600 hours on 29 October 1952. One friendly ship was standing by for necessary gun fire support. Five or six friendly aircraft were flying over heads for necessary air support. However, due to the dense mist over the area, we could not get satisfactory communication with each other. We did not have any communication with the aircraft either. The main reason why the battle was confused was the dense mist. I do not know how to describe the whole picture of the confused battle. It was, so to speak, a fiasco. On that raid we killed 67 CCF and 134 NKA. Ten friendlies were killed and 17 were wounded.

I would like to have an opportunity to appreciate and praise the bravery of Sergeant Meeks. He was always staying with the front line unit. Captain Seibert and myself and Captain Seibert's interpreter, Mr Liu, were right in the midst of enemy troops. In the confused battle, Sergeant Meeks had carried the corpse of our medical officer who had been shot and killed, deep inland all the way out to the beach. Also when the Command Post members were missing (they thought the Command Post members were missing because they had no radio contact with them), Sergeant Meeks organized one suicide squad with ten men and he took the suicide squad personally, and went deep inland about three kilometers. We could see enemy in all directions and the battle was so confused that even now I cannot describe the whole picture of the raid. Captain

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Seibert's interpreter, Mr Liu, was always staying with Captain Seibert and myself. He was killed.

I think Sergeant Meeks is one of the finest American soldiers. When we attacked Chig-gal last September he was the first person who led the suicide squad and attacked a great number of enemy. He was completely surrounded by the enemy. He threw hand grenades and fought hand-to-hand until he could get out of there. The last operation he was leading front line unit and he carried the one medical officer for about 7,000 yards from deep inland to the beach. He had the corpse on his right shoulder and an AR on his left shoulder, and four hundred CCF were chasing him. Several enemy were shooting at him from the flank and some enemy were in front of him in this confused battle. When he could not see Captain Seibert and the other Command Post staff members, he had organized one suicide squad and taken the squad approximately three kilometers inland from the beach to rescue the Command Post staff members and wanted to stay on the peninsula until the last minute. Thus in any operation Donkey 1 has performed he has participated in the operation and led the operation to a great success showing his wonderful braveness. Also he is training our Donkey 1 guerrillas every day. Every day he asks us to perform operations on the mainland.

In spite of this war he is for the sake of Korea and he is one of our allies and he is more eager than any of us for the operations. Facing danger he does not think of his own life and he thinks of his comrades, and usually he is leading them to victory. Here I would like the opportunity to keep his name in the history of the partisans -- the bravest of the brave! I would appreciate it if they would consider him favorably for a commission. If he becomes an officer he should be able to become one of the finest officers in the world. Here is our expression of profound gratitude and deepest sentiment for the brave soldier, Master Sergeant Meeks.

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THE NARRATIVE OF MR PAK CHOLL,
LEADER OF DONKEY 4 [1]

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[1]Mr Pak Choll, Leader of Donkey 4, was interviewed 1400-1700, 3 November 1952, by Lt Col A. S. Daley and Maj B. C. Mossman, on a western coastal island. The interpreter was 1st Lt Cho Byung Chan, ROKA.

During the Japanese regime in Korea, I finished Haeju high school. Afterwards until 15 August 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japan, I had been a salaried man working for a Japanese office. After the Communists came down to North Korea, I joined the Korean Democratic Youth Association, which is now a Communist association. After the Big Three Conference in Moscow reached an agreement as to the trustee policy in Korea, that all the three countries would look after Korea until it could become strong enough to take care of itself. [2] The Communists

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[2]The Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945 was an agreement among the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, to which China later subscribed. The Agreement provided for a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years. It also provided for a Joint US-USSR Commission to aid Korea to form a provisional government.

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first agreed to make an anti-trustee movement, but a few days later they changed their minds and all Communists agreed with the trustee policy. They agreed to it because it would mean that no particular United States government set-up would be in Korea.

I kept up anti-Communist uprisings and was put in jail for 3-1/2 months in Haeju. In October 1950 when the United Nations Forces came into North Korea, we made a big anti-Communist movement which the enemy

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called an armed forces revolution. Then I had been a member of the security forces during the period the United Nations troops stayed in my home territory. I was with the security forces until 4 January 1951 when I left my home with my people. Those youth that fled from my district were quite patriotic people, and they were hating Communists to the fullest extent because they had been oppressed by them for more than five years and they had been witnessing the burials of anti-Communists into the ground alive. Hence those people who came to this island were the embodiment of hostility against the Communists. They came to this island of Paengnyong-do on 13 January 1951.

The people in Seoul evacuated the city on 4 January 1951, and my people had tried to resist enemy troops until 14 January 1951. It was inevitable that we had to retreat on 14 January 1951 and we had contact with Leopard headquarters, organizing people into bands of guerrillas. On 6 March the first group of Donkey 4 was organized with 26 men. They were equipped with 10 Russian rifles, 10 carbines, and one radio. They went into Pul-tae-san, which is my home town. From then on, those people studied fighting tactics against the enemy. Like my other people, the Donkey 4 with 26 men had great difficulties on the mountains, which were covered with deep snow. Despite that they had to leave the town or they would have been discovered by the enemy. They kept moving on all the time.

They had a burning desire to fight against Communists in their home town; however, they didn't know how to fight. They had some former Japanese officers in the units who were the regular army officers, but what they knew about war was not guerrilla warfare. So they just kept moving. Finally, they started thinking of their purposes of the stay in the mountains and felt it was ridiculous. However, they managed to protect the radio until the last minutes. They intended to stay in the mountains obtaining information, but could not because of the attacks being made on them. Finally they decided to evacuate the area, leaving

about ten men behind, and they came out to Cho-do by a "wiggly" boat. They were most worried about the radio, which was secret equipment for them and for the enemy. Once the radio was captured, the enemy would know that our side practiced guerrilla tactics.

In regard to the food, they didn't have any food with them. They didn't take any food sometimes for two days. They visited the people in the villages for time to time and got food from some friends in the villages. However, it was just enough to keep them from starvation. From Cho-do they came down to here and Major Burke, who was commanding officer of the Leopard headquarters, talked with them about the experiences on the mainland and told them it would be wise to have an island base to use as a supply and operations base. He said that if they had difficulties on the mainland they could come to the island and stay and then go back to the mainland to harass the enemy. This was the reason why they started having island bases. Donkey 4 first went to Wol-lae-do and from there to Yuk-to and also to operate on the Ongjin Peninsula. In order to operate in the Chang-san-got and north of my home area which is Changyon, we had to have some island base north of the "got". So we had Cho-do as another island base. This was in July 1951. Now (1952) Donkey 4 has four island bases which are Wol-lae-do, Yuk-to, Mahap-to, and Cho-do.

The ten men who were left on the mainland will be called "cradle of Donkey 4 operations." Those ten men used Pak-sok-san as an operations base, and operating from there they went down to the villages and gathered or rescued all patriotic youth in the area. They also obtained food and information of enemy from the families of the young people they had rescued. A man named Hong Byong Su, who was a member of the ten men remaining on the mainland, first attacked Sun-taek-myon, which was his home town, where an enemy Communist Party detachment and police station detachment were located. This might be the first attack made by local

guerrillas toward the enemy since the guerrilla operations were started. It meant that there were guerrillas forces staying on the mainland and fighting against the North Korean Government. Evidently the local guerrilla attack on enemy organizations staying on the mainland had more political meaning than the results of the operations actually meant in the terms of the immediate ends of guerrilla warfare. It brought happy news to the people on the mainland who were almost hopeless about their future.

From then on our men studied recruiting and gathering of young men, training them, and they kept destroying enemy installations and obtaining enemy information. Thus Donkey 4 was growing bigger and bigger day by day. On 13 April 1951 Donkey 4 first went to Wol-lae-do. On 15 April 1951 they went to Yuk-to.

The first question in guerrilla warfare operating from an island is boat transportation. It was difficult to get boats. Donkey 4 had to have an island base closest to the mainland so they used Yuk-to as the guerrilla base. Yuk-to is about 1,500 yards from the mainland and the enemy and guerrilla can go across by foot when the tide is low. Donkey 4 had another detachment on Wol-lae-do. The people on Yuk-to had been operating in Chang-yon and Song-ha-gun area. The guerrillas in Puk-sak-san were able to get food from the friendly civilians in the area; however, it was difficult to obtain ammunition enough to fight the enemy and it was difficult to transport the ammunition from the base to Puk-sak-san. To operate deep inland they had to have another island base which would be a supply base and from where they could transport to the mainland anti-tank mines and other demolitions with which they blew up railroads and bridges. For this reason they had to have Cho-do as another island base. They had 200 people on Yuk-to and 500 on Wol-lae-do and some on Cho-do. At that time there was a unit, Donkey 3, on Cho-do.

This Donkey 3 is different from the present Donkey 3. The first

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Donkey 3 consisted of people from Yong-ha. On the mainland where they operated, they lost their radio, which was the vital equipment for guerrillas on the mainland. The radio was lost because these people had no experience as guerrillas and had very poor tactics. As a result of the radio lost they compromised their positions and other secrets and they were almost annihilated by the enemy on 10 March 1951. On or about 20 July 1951, Donkey 4 took over the command of Donkey 3, which was almost destroyed by the enemy. Another Donkey 3 was born by Donkey 4. It was new in the quality but the same in name. One of the staff members from Donkey 4 went to Donkey 3 as its leader; his name is Kim Yong Bok now leader of the Honor Guard. Since Donkey 4 took over Donkey 3, these two units became brother units. The present Donkey 3 and Donkey 4 call themselves the "White Tiger units." There have been a lot of operations performed by Donkey 3 since this change.

Until August 1951 Donkey 4 had about 800 to 850 men. Even though they received supplies from Leopard, the supplies were not sufficient to feed and equip the people in the unit, so they had to obtain some supplies from the enemy. For that purpose Ma-hap-to was selected as a supply base. Supply base here means not the place where we keep the supplies when we received them from our headquarters, but the place we get supplies from the enemy. Operating from Ma-hap-to we captured many bags of grain from the mainland across from Ma-hap-to since August 1951.

For example, once we captured 30 oxcarts full of grain which the enemy government was going to confiscate from the civilians under the name of the spot-tax material. We guerrillas went to the area where the enemy government was supervising the civilians harvesting those grains and we attacked the enemy and we could stop the enemy government taking those grains away from the civilians. We gave the grains back to the civilians in that area and they were always willing to give us a good portion of the grains in the meaning of thanks for the help we afforded them. We also captured oxen and oxcarts on the mainland; anything which

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is worth something to us we take from the enemy or any civilians who are not friends of ours. Thus Donkey 4 operations were remarked among the finest of the guerrilla warfare. The leader who led this unit to such a great success was named Chang Sok Lin, who commanded this Donkey 4 operation until the end of 1951. At the end of 1951 there were approximately 1,200 guerrillas with Donkey 4 and the unit was regarded as one of the finest in the Leopard organization.

The guerrilla units are more or less a political society and the leader had been one of the finest guerrilla leaders. Chang Sok Lin is the very person who led the Donkey 4 to such a great success. However, the former leader began getting dull in his command efficiency in that unit when he heard there was a possibility that the Panmunjom truce talks would reach a success. Until the time, Chang was the finest leader, but he started at length to have a love of material and money. It came to pass that one of the ten people who were staying in Puk-sak-san under the leader started thinking the former leader ought to be eliminated from Donkey 4. On 1 January 1952 the Donkey 4 leader was shot. Kim Joon Gol was the man that killed the former leader.

Chang Sok Lin, the first commanding officer of Donkey 4, was educated in Japan. When Korea was liberated from Japan, he came back to Korea to his home town, and he became a chief of myon. Then he went to South Korea, where he became a policeman in a police station. He later joined the intelligence corps of the ROK Navy until the war broke out. When the United Nations Forces came back to North Korea, Chang came with them. But despite this the people could see in him that he had a great love for money.

Now I realize that in the guerrilla forces there should be established a chain of command, as in the Regular Army. Yet although the guerrilla forces are similar to the Regular Army, they are also quite different from the Regular Army. Guerrilla forces are very difficult to command.

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In the Regular Army, as you know, all you have to do is take an order from superior officers and obey them. Your superior officer might sometimes put out an order which might be wrong; however, you cannot talk about the order. In the guerrilla forces, particularly in the youth movement groups, you cannot put out an unreasonable order or do what you want to do as a leader of the youth group. The man who is leading the group should not have any love of material things.

The first leader of Donkey 4 had been at the beginning a very fine leader without any selfish love of material gain for himself, but when he started getting love of material things, the way he commanded the unit was a real dictator's way of doing so. Chang also put his family into important positions, such as to be administrative officer for Donkey 4, he who handled materials from the CP and captured material from the enemy. Again, the assistant administrative officer was his younger brother's wife's father. Again, the man in charge of Wol-lae-do was Chang's younger brother. Thus he was a dictator, he was unreasonable and he had a love of material things. The two men previously related had made up their minds to kill the leader to save the 1,200 people. They decided to eliminate Chang, the first former leader; therefore, they killed him. He did not know it when they planned to kill him. Even in the guerrilla units I realize there should be a strong chain of command; however, the first Donkey 4 leader was a dictator. That is the reason why Chang was killed.

Now at that time, Yonwi-do, Sun-wi-do, and Changin-do were under great threat of the enemy because of the cold and severe winter approaching. The enemy was trying to get rid of the guerrillas on the islands and were attacking island bases because they were being hindered by the guerrillas at that time. Special troops, coastal garrison, which was a part of the 239th Army Unit, 23d Brigade, west coastal defense forces, were trying to wipe out the guerrillas. Accordingly we moved the head-

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quarters from Yuk-to to Wol-lae-do. The interior trouble and exterior threatening trouble, and affairs ending in the assassination of the leader, made quite a few of the people leave the unit for freedom down south. They didn't like anymore the oppression of the leader. That was the day when Donkey 4 was in great trouble! It was a crisis for Donkey 4!

Due to the internal trouble of the unit and the external threatening trouble of the enemy, truly Donkey 4 could not produce any operations. In spite of the weakness which led to his death, the first leader, Chang, had led Donkey 4 to be a great unit. The commanding officer, Major McKean, suspected that Donkey 4 might have some Communists in it because Donkey 4 killed one of the best Donkey leaders, who had killed more Communists and founded one of the best guerrilla units, and that he was killed without any particular reason. They were also not producing any results. Frankly, Major McKean did not now trust this unit and did not like it. He thought it was ridiculous therefore to have Donkey 3 subordinate to Donkey 4 despite the fact that Donkey 4 was doing a good job. It was also a more efficient way to have Donkey 3 take orders and draw supplies from this Leopard headquarters, so he separated Donkey 3 from Donkey 4 and made it a separate unit. Now Donkey 3 is an independent unit. This was in the first part of January 1952.

I didn't blame Major McKean, who didn't like Donkey 4 and suspected them of having Communists, because he did not have any way to know the truth. I also feel very sorry for the First Donkey 4 leader who was killed by his own men. Chang Sok Lin was no Communist. He was a great leader of patriotic youth. Once a man dies he will never come back! At the same time, I feel that an unjust leader cannot be endured as a leader of a youth movement, and his death was for the good of more than one thousand patriotic youth. I regret that this command post did not see the truth about Donkey 4, and I will be very happy if the command post finds

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public opinion in the future and learns the truth sooner.

There was a radio operator, SCR 300 set, of Donkey 4, who was on the mainland and was one of the most faithful followers of the assassinated Donkey 4 leader. When the leader was killed, many troubles occurred in Donkey 4 units. Among them, the radio operator was found to be missing on the mainland. Naturally the Donkey people were worried about the radio. They could never tell when the enemy might surprise Yuk-to. Accordingly they sent patrols on the mainland, and if any enemy were seen, they were to make a bonfire on one of the hills across from Yuk-to. On the night of 2 February 1952 the friendly agents made a big bonfire on the hill; however, the people who were staying on Yuk-to disregarded it because at that time many friendly ships were protecting the islands. The ships had bombarded the mainland every night and those people regarded the bonfire as part of the ships' fire on the mainland.

The enemy had heavy weapons aimed accurately at Yuk-to during daylight hours. The enemy was camouflaged and invisible to us. They had many machine guns, PPSH's, and automatic rifles. Donkey 4 did not have many good weapons to use against the enemy. All Donkey 4 had were Japanese '99 rifles and other light weapons. Well, that night the enemy sent trucks as far as the beach across from Yuk-to. They then used motor boats and two hundred men were sent to Yuk-to. The people on Yuk-to fought bravely against overwhelming enemy troops, who numbered about two hundred. Right after the enemy landed, the battle began and was one of the most serious. The main body of the friendly troops climbed up Hill 41 on Yuk-to whence, as the enemy surrounded the hill, the only way to escape was to jump from the big cliff. The friendly troops went into caves on the hill which were very difficult for the enemy to get to as there was only one narrow road toward the caves and the friendly troops picked off the enemy as they came up the road.

The enemy asked the guerrillas to surrender. The guerrillas could

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hear them clearly because the enemy was on top of the cliff. The friendly troops said they were hungry and for them to wait until we cook our rice and eat our meal. The enemy said, "If you come out we will give you chow." They also said, "This is the Utopia of the Republic of Korea and we have everything and you have hell."

We said, "It will never happen. We are fighting for the truth and we are young men and you are too; you are fighting for what you believe is the truth, we are fighting for what we believe is the truth."

The enemy said what we are fighting for is wrong, what they are fighting for is true.

The friendly said, "All right, we have two truths, now we will see what truth is the real truth; your truth might be true, so may ours; time will tell."

The enemy said, "All right, if you are not going to surrender to us, the only thing we can do is to kill all of you. We will give you one chance, here is one of your comrades. If you want to shoot him, then shoot him."

Before that our (friendly) radio was destroyed and we had no communication with our headquarters. They didn't know we were in a great battle because we were not able to warn them.

Then the enemy started to drop a lot of rails from the top of the cliff to the cave. We asked, "What is that for?" They said, "You can climb up by these rails." We took the rails and dropped some of them into the ocean and kept some in the cave. Then the enemy started to come down the path. One of our comrades was first to come, then the North Koreans came behind him to induce our troops to surrender. The friend who was tied behind the back was quite strong enough to break the cord and then he bit the North Korean Army soldier's nose. The friendly forces then shot the NKA. The man got into the cave and was safe. Then the fighting started and we could stay there for some time as we had enough food and ammunition to last for quite some time. The

enemy threw hand grenades at us. One of them fell at the foot of the cliff at the mouth of the cave. We tried to protect ourselves as best we could from the fragmentation of the grenades, but some men were wounded in the arms, legs, and face.

Finally, friendly reinforcements, after receiving no answer over the radio and figuring something was wrong, arrived and the enemy retreated. The men who were captured by the enemy were taken to Un-pa village and put in jail. They were able to break through the window and ran. About ten of them escaped and came back to Yuk-to.

Also, three friendly troops were captured and sent to Chang-yon police station and sentenced to death. The jail was made a three-story cellar way; first you go down, then you go down deeper, and then you go down deeper again. There seemed no hope at all for those men. But they plucked a nail out of the wall and with that they unlocked the door and came out. While the guards were sleeping, they slipped out and ran. They had run about seven hundred meters when the enemy fired; however, they escaped and went to Pul-ta-san, which is a guerrilla base.

One battalion commander, his name was Ho Song Yong, and another man, Oh Song Guk, were leading the guerrilla troops on Yuk-to during this attack. There they were seriously wounded, but there still was some chance for them to get away. However, they thought the situation was hopeless and critical and they preferred death to surrender and capture, which would mean compromising the unit principles. They were worried about the people on the mainland. So Ho Song Yong committed suicide with a grenade. The other man, who was in charge of Chong-san-got, also killed himself for the same reason. All this action occurred on 2 February 1952.

I will tell you now of our way of fighting. In regard to the method of attacking or capturing enemy equipment or destroying installations, the surprise is the most important principle of guerrilla warfare. I will explain the surprise element. Guerrilla forces are not well trained as the regular forces are, and they are not as well equipped. They

evaluate their positions in respect that they can see the enemy and the enemy cannot see them. It is the theory of guerrillas that there is nothing but surprise, which is the principle that they follow. We guerrillas had no theory but we have had experience which is most important for us. In the experience we found the theory, and the experience we have had so far has taught us the element of surprise is the best. I repeat, surprise is the whole of guerrilla warfare.

You obtain information of the enemy and then you think the strength of your force is capable of attacking them. You can choose the time and the place you would like to hit them. The enemy would never expect you because of your smaller number. You are very seldom seen by the enemy. That means you have the choice of the attacking time and place. You have information of enemy troop concentration, and you have a certain number of people under you. You would like to hit the enemy, but if you think that you are unable to hit them, you scatter your forces and you might be able to get some information of the unit which is planning to attack you. Once you get the information you escape from the area.

Therefore, guerrilla intelligence is next to the vital thing. To surprise the enemy you have to have previous intelligence of the enemy. According to the information, you can determine when and where is the best time and place for you to surprise them. Also before you attack certain concentrations, you have to move your new headquarters base location. You should never make any operation near your base because if you do, the enemy forces will be invited to your area. Pul-ta-san and Pak-sok-san are used as my base headquarters. They are just one of the mountains used as a base.

The guerrilla's three principles are to concentrate, hit, and run. It is a mistake to have large groups of guerrillas moving on the mainland behind the enemy lines. The maximum number to move behind the enemy lines is fifteen men. If you have more than fifteen, you have more

chances to be discovered by the enemy. You have less chances to obtain food from the enemy and civilians. When you see the enemy, you have to re-group very quickly and hit them. If you have inferior equipment, you should not fight them a long time because they will bring up their re-inforcements and the action will no longer be a surprise. Fighting a short time only is a very important factor. We are operating in that area which we are familiar with and we know every path and corner in the area. We never have a group of more than fifteen men and after they hit the enemy they rendezvous at a pre-determined position.

It is one of the easiest guerrilla operations to hit the enemy grains and capture or destroy it because in such places as the grain is located, there are not too many enemy forces. All you do is pass through the guard line, and if you get through this line then all you have to do is go to the place where the grain is piled, such as a rice paddy. You have one or two beer bottles filled with gasoline. Before you set fire you spread the gasoline over the piles of grain. You have three or four men and each one has two bottles of gasoline and they spread it over the surface of the spot-tax material. You have a hand grenade incendiary and before you pull the pin out you put it into the grains. Then you scatter. Guerrillas should never try to be heroic men. You have to be working all the time and no one should play hero. You should never let the enemy know who, what, or when, about an attack. Just do it.

I cannot tell definitely a rule about killing enemy personnel. It all depends on the situation. If we can capture him we do, and then we take him to the mountains and interrogate him. If we are in a hurry and want to destroy an office, then we shoot the guards, but if we have time we take them for questioning. Usually you do not kill the sentries. You have a main purpose which is more important than killing one man. By killing him you might lose your main mission. The method of killing also depends on the situation.

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One of the hardest things for guerrillas to do is to attack a place that no airplane, air strikes, or naval gun fire can attack. These are usually fortified positions and emplacements. But if that emplacement is in our way, we have to destroy it. But it is the hardest job for us to do.

We use about fifteen men to attack a building, say a command post or a headquarters. We usually surround it from three directions. First we shoot the guards standing outside. The first shot will kill the guard and the first rounds are also the signal for opening fire on the enemy, who is surprised completely. We use carbines and any other weapons we have. About one half of the enemy will be killed very quickly. Then we throw grenades into the house, and after they go off we enter the building and kill or capture whatever men are still alive and take whatever we have use for. If we want to capture him we do, if we want to kill him, we do that too. These attacks are usually made at night when the enemy cannot see us. Attacks like this last no more than ten minutes.

Whenever we attack, we do not rely fully on civilian agents. We double check on the information they give us just before the attack is to take place to see if the civilian information is correct. If it is correct, then we attack.

Once We attacked Song-ha Hot Springs jail and rescued sixty prisoners out of it. In Un-yu, Yul-li, Song-chon, Hu-nam, To-won-myon, Mo-gang, Yong-yon, Shinphwa, Sun-taek, and Pung-chon we attacked enemy jails or any places of imprisonment to free prisoners. They usually use caves and trenches or pits for jails. When we cannot find the key to the locks we use the M1 rifle to blow off the lock and open the door and set the prisoners free. These prisoners are full of emotion when they are released and they start to cry and they yell, "Long live the Republic of Korea!" They often question the guerrillas as to who they are and where they are from, but all we tell them is that we came here for a certain

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purpose and we do not tell them anything else. Sometimes we take them to the islands, and other times we let them go their own ways.

I would like to mention three items to you. Once you hit one place the enemy gets restless and places more strength into that position. You will never hit that position again. It would be foolish! You go some place else and hit the enemy not expecting you. The saying is, "You make the noise in the east and hit the enemy in the west!" You never hit the same place twice. It is too bad for the friendly civilians living in North Korea because, secondly, we have to capture or destroy the food because it may fall into the enemy's hands. So we have to deprive the civilians of their food or destroy or capture it. We force a great loss on the enemy in that respect.

Third, there are two ways to capture the enemy alive, which we are using. One is to ambush them by a road or path or mountain in your own uniforms or civilian clothes. When the enemy comes by, you stand out in the road with your hand extended and then you take them. The other way is to use North Korean uniforms and walk along the street and maybe you will meet three, four, or five enemy on the road. You are never afraid. You will have four or five men with you. Before you do this however, you must know where the enemy is located and from what points they walk around. When you meet them you say, "Who is there?" You say that if it is night. In daylight too, you yell, "Who is there?" The enemy will say, according to his custom, "Thank you, comrade!" You will repeat this. Then you yell at them to hold up their hands and they will be surprised. They will say, "We are comrades!" Then you say, "How the hell can we tell that you are comrades? Because there are so many guerrillas operating in this area, we have to be careful. Just to make sure, present your identification cards." At this time you are aiming at them with your rifles. Then when they show you their cards and after getting them, you will accompany them and either shoot them or capture

them. The identification cards are used later on after the pictures are changed on them.

Once we attacked in the Song-chong district where the enemy battalion command post was located. The target was not the command post but another enemy concentration which we hit. However, if we hit this other concentration first, reinforcements would be able to come from the command post and maybe wipe us out. In order to avoid reinforcement of the enemy, we sent our main force to the target and three men of my unit to the command post location. One of the men who went to the battalion command post had a light machine gun and fired on the battalion command post. The command post was surprised. At the same time the main force started hitting their target and the battalion command post, under fire, forgot to reinforce the target. In the meantime, the main target was completely destroyed. This is another method of attacking.

It was wise to hit the enemy positions, not one position seriously, but various positions with small strength. Do not use many people for one target. Hit them all. The enemy has to tie down their large troop units in the area to ward off these attacks and this means that many troops will not be committed in action on the frontlines. Once we hit the enemy in the Chang-san-got area in many places at the same time. The enemy thought there were many thousands of Korean Marine Corps personnel stationed here and said that no one would be allowed to leave the area because of the great number of marines operating in the area.

There is another method used to hinder enemy transportation and convoys. You pick one spot such as two roads here and two roads here on the main supply route. There is another road not so good for transportation, but it can be used if the others are blocked. Then anti-tank mines are buried in zigzag lines in the main road. When an enemy truck hits a mine, the rest of them become afraid. They will get nervous and then will use the other road, which is not in very good condition. They

are not expecting any guerrillas to ambush them. Such an area is ideal for an ambush of the trucks and we have no trouble ambushing them.

Many times we kill the enemy by ambushing them. Here is another way to do it. We send a few men down in broad daylight in an inducing (decoy) operation. They go then, to the command post and start firing. The enemy will chase them when they are running away, and they never think that they are running into an ambush. When they get to a certain spot three or four guerrillas ambush them in broad daylight.

In conclusion, the tactics of guerrilla warfare are entirely different from the tactics of the Regular Army because the Regular Army has more and better equipment and the men are well trained. The principles of guerrilla warfare are to hit the enemy in his weakest points and when they are ready to strike back to escape.

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THE NARRATIVE OF MR LEE JUNG HOK, LEADER OF DONKEY 11, "THE STUDENTS."[1]

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[1]Mr Lee Jung Hok, Leader of Donkey 11, was interviewed 1320-1720, 4 November 1952, by Lt Col A. S. Daley and Major B. C. Mossman, on a western coastal island. The interpreter was 1st Lt. Cho Byung Chan, ROKA.

During the Japanese regime I had finished Myong-shin High School in Chae-ryong. After I finished the high school, I went to my native town which was in Kyo-jong-myon in Ongjin-gun. My native town is located just north of the 38th parallel. I was a school teacher at a primary school on 15 August 1945. Four months later I crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea and enrolled in a provisional course (a special course) at Tong-guk University in Seoul. I had not stayed in the university very long because of financial problems. Then I went back to my home in North Korea. When I returned to my home town I was put in jail by the North Korean police for the necessary interrogation which was, by regulation, required for anybody who came from South Korea. I had been imprisoned for a week when I was released from the North Korean police station jail. I joined the Chosen Democratic Party (the white party),[2] and I had joined the Chosen Democratic

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[2]"White" here carries somewhat the political connotations attached to the word in modern European political jargon. In addition white implies, as used by a Korean, attributes of honor, age, wisdom, spiritual quality, etc. During this interview, the Hang-guk Party was described as being the "white of the white."

Party myon detachment as the chief of the propaganda section. And

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while I was working for the party detachment, I used to go down to South Korea and come back -- quite frankly to have contact with the South Korean Hang-guk Democratic Party.

At that time I had one special school which I called middle institute, at which I had sixty boys and girls I taught English and mathematics in the institute. The social status of those school boys was not so good from the Communist view point because they were sons or daughters of the rich class. At least they were not under the category which the committee called "good" social status. I, also, was not enjoying "good" social status from the Communist viewpoint. Therefore, the Communists had continually watched me. I was arrested by the North Korean police and was sent to Haeju police station where I was imprisoned for a month. When I was released from the police station I returned to the Institute and I taught those school boys and girls for two months more. Then I crossed the 38th parallel for the second time down to South Korea. It was April 1948, two years before the war broke out. Then I entered a special course at the Seoul Kung-min University. I entered the Department of Political Science at the University when I finished the special course. While I was attending the University, I was working for a press. Also I had been tutoring as a part-time job until 25 June 1950, when the Communists invaded South Korea. I could not graduate because the Communists invaded South Korea.

As the UN forces advanced into North Korea, I again became a schoolmaster in my home town. When the UN forces retreated from North Korea I took refuge on an island, Chang-lin-do,* with the school boys and girls as the schoolmaster. I found approximately eight hundred school boys and some college boys on Chang-lin-do, Ohwa-do, Mahap-to, Ki-rin-do, and Sun-wi-do. Those high school boys and college students came from Ongjin, which is located in South Korea below the 38th parallel, and

* Ch'angnin-do ? XB9185

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some from Inchon and Seoul and various other places.

I found that part of those students and high school boys were former members of the Students Volunteer Corps which had been co-operating with the ROK Army in the Po-hang operation and other areas in South Korea when the UN forces and ROKA were retreating to the south, and the other part of those students were the group which could not escape when the Communists invaded South Korea. Those students and high school boys had been in hiding. There were a group of school boys and students without any disciplinary regulations or anybody to take care of them, and without a chain of command.

It was public opinion in that area at that time that the students and high school boys group should have some kind of organization and order with regulations and disciplinary rules. It seemed true that they had had several conferences before I met them and they had tried to get in touch with higher authority in order to organize Student Volunteer Corps. When I had arrived at Chang-lin-do several representatives of that group called on me, and they said that they knew I was in my home town and they had been waiting for me. They asked me to be their leader. Then I answered the representatives of the students and high school boys that I was still a student of a university and that I still had my books with me even in my refugee life, at that I wished to have a practical job in a practical society after my graduation from college. I also told them that I could be an advisor to help them, but I could not be a leader of the group.

However, they had kept asking me to be the leader of the group and finally those students who had attended college special courses at the university and the senior high school boys selected me as Chairman of the Preliminary Committee, which was organized as a preparatory organization for the Students' Volunteer Corps. Then we committee members had conferences for five days and, on 4 February 1951, the Students'

Volunteer Corps was born by the hand of the Preliminary Committee of which I was chairman. When the Students' Volunteer Corps was born, I was also selected as leader. There were approximately four hundred young boys in the Students' Volunteer Corps. We had Chang-lin-do, Ki-rin-do, and Mahap-to at that time. The ages of the students ranged from eighteen to twenty-three years of age.

They adopted three mottos: (1) We will follow and we will justify the Hwa-rang spirit. (2) We will live in accordance with the pure racial spirit. (3) We will protect our beings as students; We will remain students.

I was the leader of the Students' Volunteer Corps. Under me there were two assistant leaders: Kim Myong Kyu and Mok Yong Sol, who were former students. The First Branch Unit stayed on Chang-lin-do with unit headquarters. The Second Branch Unit was located on Ki-rin-do. The Third Branch Unit was on Mohap-to.

There were schools on Ohwa-do, Sun-wi-do, and Yong-ho-do. We had organized those students on those three islands and had them join our unit. In the first part of March 1951, we had approximately eight hundred in our unit. First of all, we started doing our work on those students by having them attend our institute founded in our own Students' Volunteer Corps according to the third motto and we taught our own Students' Volunteer Corps members English, national language, mathematics, and national history in our Institute. The teachers in the institute were selected from our own Students' Volunteer Corps or invited from the middle schools on those islands. We also sent some of our members to the middle or primary schools as teachers. There was at the time no way to obtain news on those islands. So we served our Students' Volunteer Corps members, as well as the inhabitnats and the refugees on those islands by delivering newspapers to them or giving them news

which we obtained by our radio. Also we tried to keep the islands clean, having the people on the islands clean them. Also we had taken action on the private domestic liquor, which we considered a bad influence to the military discipline. Until that time we did not have any weapons.

While we were staying on those islands we had been obtaining information of the enemy from the mainland, sending our men to the mainland, and from time to time we were also attacking enemy installations on the mainland with weapons which we could borrow from organizations on those islands. On the islands was an armed force called the 26th Regiment, Ulchi Armed Corps.[3] They said that they had heard that there

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[3] Ulchi is the talented and famous Korean hero, General Ulchi-Moonduck. He defended the kingdom of Ko-Ku-ryo against the invading hosts of the Chinese emperor Yang in 611 A.D. Ulchi's Tabian tactics resulted, according to the old historians, in the utter destruction of a Chinese Army of 300,000 men.

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was a United Nations organization on Paengnyong-do. We made up our minds to visit the UN CP on Panengnyong-do and on 27 March 1951 we finally contacted Major Burke, Commanding Officer of Leopard Base. We began a Donkey unit with the name of Donkey 11 on the same day. At that time seven of us were visiting Major Burke and we received fourteen Japanese 99 rifles and two or three bags of rice, and starting from that time we started a primitive form of guerrilla forces, bringing information of the enemy, or results of operations, to the CP.

On 14 April 1951, thirty of us with our own rifles and some weapons we borrowed from other organizations landed on the mainland and per-

formed our first operation at Yong-am-ni, Yong-chon-myon. In that first action we killed seven or eight enemy soldiers but took no prisoners. We captured some enemy documents and papers, and several rifles.

On the first visit we had received fourteen rifles and we thought it was because we went to Major Burke with just seven men. With this in mind I then brought thirty boys, all of whom were quite young compared to the others. This thirty received twenty rifles, which made a total of thirty-four rifles in my unit. Borrowing some more rifles from friendly units, I took seventy armed partisans and landed again on the mainland on 15 April 1951. We attacked the enemy in Kyonchong, taking defensive positions in all of Kyonchong area. We brought 1,200 refugees off the mainland, captured 1,500 bags of rice, killed seventeen NKA. None of us were killed or wounded. By selling those bags of rice we could make for the first time a "confidential fund" and we first started keeping records, making a roster of all our members. We bought some uniforms and thus we lined ourselves up as a unit. The action of 15 April 1951 is what I call the first Kyon-chong operation.

On 18 April 1951, we attacked in Kyon-chong-myon again. Sixteen sail junks and three motor junks were used for the landing. We first had advanced for about four kilometers inland from our base and we had taken defense positions there. However, due to poor information we did not know there were overwhelming numbers of the enemy located there. When we found those enemy troops located in the area, we pulled our forces from the area and retreated as far as coast line. The enemy was already chasing us. Actually we did have enough time to escape by boat. However, we did not get on board the boats because of the civilian refugees, who were the first to be loaded. In the meantime the enemy had completly surrounded us from three directions. Enemy shells and mortar rounds were falling along the sides of the boats. Therefore, those boats had to leave the mainland, without taking us. Our final defense

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line was under a great enemy threat. At first we had occupied three hills. As the enemy attack was getting more and more serious we lost one and then another hill. Finally we had just one hill left and we were also running out of ammunition. On our right flank was the enemy. The main body of the enemy forces was coming from the front. On our left flank was the enemy. Right behind us was the ocean where no boats were waiting for us. It seemed to be our last moment.

Some of our men who were not armed were already swimming in the ocean and I told my liaison man to go down the hill and bring TNT which was placed at the foot of the hill. However the liaison man could not go because the enemy bullets were coming like rain. The hill which we were holding was by then completely surrounded by the enemy. I told another liaison man to go down and bring the TNT, but he could not go. Then somebody in front of me yelled, "Here comes the hand grenades!" and I saw the man who yelled those words was a North Korean soldier about twenty or thirty yards in front of me. The hand grenades which the enemy threw at me exploded back of me. Then one of my men rushed up to my hole and yelled, "Regimental Commander, I have run out of ammunition for my Russian rifle!" There was no ammunition around me. I told him, "No ammunition," and to stay with me. Another AR man rushed up to my hole and desperately he cried, saying, "No ammunition!" One bullet passed through his left thigh. He fell down in the hole. I almost could hear the enemy breathing. I was almost beside myself and I lost my sight with excitement and tension, I could not see anything! Apparently I shouted one word of command which I cannot remember. Suddenly I found all of my men rushing and jumping into the ocean. The enemy started firing from the top of the hill, and the ocean was colored by the blood of friendly partisans. In the ocean twenty of my men were killed; fifty finally could escape. When rescued, I had been swimming in the ocean for three or four hours. This was the second Kyong-chong operation.

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About 20 April 1951, for the purpose of revenge for those friends killed by the enemy, we went to the ROK ships 61 and 507. After we had related the story all about the second Kyong-chong operation, then the friendly ships were willing to help us. So we set out with the ships for Kyong-chong again, to kill the enemy and to rescue the friendly partisans straggling in the district and to bring back our corpses abandoned there. However, we found the enemy guards were quite a severe obstacle because they already had notice of our plotting, seeing the ship movement. Therefore the operation could not be performed except for the naval bombardment.

After the fiasco on the Kyong-chong operation, I had moved my headquarters to Yong-ho-do, for variety and to revive the friendly fighting spirit. My headquarters were on Yong-ho-do in an old customs house. At that time I had five battalions in my unit. Each battalion was located on one of the islands, Yong-ho-do, Sun-wi-do, Chang-lin-do, Ohwa-do, and Ki-rin-do. On each island I had my staff members, training them and educating them. Also, each battalion had been operating from its island to the mainland. In the first part of July 1951, the 26th Regiment of the Ulchi Armed Corps had become a part of Donkey 11 as a special battalion. Then my strength became 1,700 men. The table of organization for Donkey 11 was as follows: Commanding Officer, Lee Jung Hok; Vice-regimental CO, Lee Mun Ho; Adjutant, Kim Myong Gyu; S1 Oh Yong Gun; S2, Lee Bom Shik; S3, Lee Jong Ohn; S4, Shin Song Hyo; S5 (military discipline officer), Oh Dok Su; 1st Guerrilla Battalion CO, Yoo Myong Hang; 2d Guerrilla Battalion CO, Mok Yong Sol; 3d Guerrilla Battalion CO, Lee Chi Yong; 5th Guerrilla Battalion CO, Kwon Yong Ho; 6th Guerrilla Battalion CO, Kim Wan Yong; Special Battalion CO, Bak Bong Ju. Each battalion was organized with the people staying on one island. Therefore the strength of each battalion was not the same. Some battalions had seventy, some had two hundred, and the reason for the "special"

battalion was that I had the 26th Regiment of the Ulchi Armed Corps join my unit, and they were not a regular unit of my unit. I named the battalion the Special Battalion. I had the Special Battalion defending the northern part of Yong-ho-do on which my headquarters were located.

After that there were many small operations performed by each battalion.

In regard to Mohap-to, there was a detachment of the 3d Battalion staying on Mohap-to. There were thirty men in the detachment. In a month they killed about twenty enemy and captured six PWs.

On Chang-lin-do, the battalion had performed an operation in the Songang area which I called the So-gang operation, on 17 June 1951. Seventy of the battalion participated in the operation; they killed about twenty enemy, captured one PW alive. There was another operation performed in the Yong-ho-do area. Mo-ho-ri, which is located across from Yong-ho-do, was attacked by thirty men of the battalion on Yong-ho-do. This operation lasted for about thirty days. During these days, the friendly had been staying in the mountains. In this one-month operation, we captured eighteen NKA and we killed a little more than fifty NKA.

I had been having difficulties with the fact that there were too many people in my unit whom I was not able to feed. Therefore last September 1951, I had selected about six hundred people among the 1,700 people as my unit. First of all I selected those people who did not have any families to support, secondly, I selected the ones who already had combat experience; thirdly, I selected students, high school boys. Those of the 1,700 who were not chosen to remain guerrillas were given the choice of remaining on the island or going south, but in any case were no longer connected with Donkey 11. Also the Special Battalion disbanded and became a regular member of my unit. I divided the six hundred people into two battalions. One was called the West

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Battalion and the other was called the East Battalion. Sun-wi-do and the islands east of Sun-wi-do belonged to the East Battalion. Ohwa-do, Chang-lin-do, Ki-rin-do, and Mahap-to were under the West Battalion. Adjutant Kim Yong Byu, was the West Battalion CO. Former battalion commanders were company commanders and the former battalions became companies. The following islands off the coast south of Ongjin were under the East Battalion: Sun-wi-do, Yong-ho-do, (Yongwi-do?), Pa-do, Wi-do, (Wi-som) Cha-do, Shin-do, Yong-pyong-do (Yonp-yong-do?), and Mu-do. In the same manner the former battalion commanders and the battalions became company commanders and companies in the East Battalion. The East Battalion Commander was Lee Jon Ohn, former S-3. The East Battalion had performed the Song-gang operation and the Tong-nam-myon operation. It is difficult now to remember the number of prisoners and the number of captured weapons in each operation. The West Battalion had performed the So-gang operation and the Bon-yong operation after that.

Early in November 1951, Cha-do was attacked and captured by the enemy. Cha-do was an important point for the transmission of intelligence. At that time we had a small radio on the mainland which sent messages to unit headquarters, whence they could be relayed to the CP. This was the first move in a campaign to drive us from the islands. Next the enemy attacked Shin-do. In the Shin-do operation fifty or sixty enemy soldiers were killed and nine of us were killed. Twenty of us were missing. We retreated to Yong-ho-do.

On 1 January 1952, the enemy invaded Yong-ho-do and after a severe engagement we withdrew from Yong-ho-do to Ohwa-do. Then we lost Ohwa-do and concentrated at Chang-lin-do. All units which were staying on islands in that sea area had retreated to Chang-lin-do. On the night of 9 January 1952, the enemy successfully attacked Chang-lin-do, and we retreated to Kirin-do. I counted my men on Kirin-do. There were 430 left.

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Unlike other Donkey units, which were organized with people who had been members of police detachments or the armed security forces, my unit was raised strictly with students. That meant that while all other units had some kind of heavy weapons, mine was equipped with just rifles. The result was that we had to fight the enemy troops which invaded our islands with just small arms. And we lost those islands despite our desperate efforts.

By the time my people had lost Yong-ho-do and the other three islands, they had been in cruel battles and many of my people had extremely broken hearts and also the feeling of fear, I had to send such peopleto Paengyong-do or Tae-chon-do (Taech'ong-do) for a rest. When they had recovered from broken hearts and fatigue, I regrouped them on Kirin-do and gave them communication training and intelligence training. Last April 1952, with Donkey 1, we attacked Chang-lin-do. We took Chang-lin-do from the enemy's hands and also we attacked Ohwa-do, Sun-wi-do and finally Yong-ho-do, taking all of these islands back from the enemy. Then we were back home again. This reoccupation was completed in April.

By that time the supply situation of weapons, rice and clothing was much better than it had been. So the fighting spirit of my people had kept growing higher and higher. Also, learning from experience we had in the past, we realized it was quite necessary to have a complete agent net established on the mainland. So we had established a complete agent cell net on the mainland. We even persuaded enemy policemen and some Communist Party members to change their minds and become friendly agents through our friendly civilian agents. Also in the high mountains such as Chon-jan-san, Kuk-sa-bong, Kuk-so-bong, Nok-dol-san and Un-pa-san, we had our guerrilla cell stations and they operated from the secret guerrilla base. They obtained information from the enemy as well as operating as partisans on the mainland. The intelligence activity through such a complete agent cell net was wonderfully performed. We also put

two SCR 300 radios on the mainland and through the agent-net sets we were able to obtain any kind of information. In particular, the enemy's troop strength and operational plans used to be in our hands in advance of the performance. Close radio contact between the mainland and the island base greatly helps to link the activities of the guerrillas on both.

We moved our headquarters to Ohwa-do. While we were holding the four islands of Yong-ho-do, Chang-lin-do, Ohwa-do, and Sun-wi-do. The 1st Battalion was on Chang-lin-do. Headquarters and the headquarters duty company was located on Ohwa-do. The 2d Battalion was on Sun-wi-do. One detachment was located on Tong-ho-do.

Until last April and May, 1952, Donkey 11 operations were at a peak. We captured three Chinese soldiers and many NKA troops, and killed many of the enemy.

On 20 June 1952, with Lieutenant McBride, who was then advisor from the CP to Donkey 11, the whole Donkey 11 regiment surprised one NKA company, of 177 men, located at Allang-ni, Hung-myon. We had succeeded to have one of them come over to our side before the action. We had the whole picture of the defense arrangement of the company, including the exact location of guards. We completely surrounded the command post. In that fight we captured eighty-two NKA soldiers. Of the rest only three managed to escape -- all the rest were killed. On returning to the base with our prisoners, we encountered a great number of enemy re-inforcements. Nevertheless, we managed to bring thirteen prisoners of war to the command post. We captured 27 PPSHs, 13 Russian rifles, one Russian pistol, 22 Japanese 99 rifles, 150 hand grenades, enemy maps, over 20,000 rounds of ammunition, quite a few bags of rice, and oxcarts. Two of our motor junks and thirteen sail junks were used for the operation. The friendly strength was 250 men.

On 15 July 1952, 200 enemy equipped with six mortars and four Maxim heavy machine guns and rifles and a SCR 300 invaded Chang-lin-do by

six rubber boats, at approximately 4 o'clock in the morning. At that time I had one hundred men on Chang-lin-do. The commander of the enemy battalion which attacked Chang-lin-do ranked as a senior captain, wearing four middle-sized stars. Receiving these overwhelming enemy troops, the friendlies had fought bravely for a couple of hours but inevitably retreated to Ohwa-do. Our re-taking action started at 7 o'clock on the morning of the next day, 16 July 1952, and Lieutenant McBride was with us again. During the night of 15 July 1952, about a hundred of the enemy with six mortars escaped from Chang-lin-do. Next day when we had re-taken Chang-lin-do completely, we had thirty-eight persons captured alive. Also we captured one radio, three Maxim machine guns and eighty rifles. All the rest of the enemy were killed during the operation. The thirty-eight prisoners of war included four enemy officers, the assistant battalion commander, a captain, one staff officer, and two company commanders. In this operation we were supported by naval gun-fire and airplanes.

After the Chang-lin-do operation, we requested the commanding officer of Leopard CP to increase our strength. This being done, the strength of Donkey 11 became 550. Headquarters remained on Ohwa-do. The command and staff was as follows: Regimental CO, Lee Jung Hok; Chief of Staff, Kim Myong Gyu; S-1, Sahin Myong Un; S-2, Kwon Yong Ho; S-3, Kang Song Ugg; S-4, Lim Kwang Il; S-5, Lee Jong Ohn; Information and Education Officer, Kang Sok Lin; Chief of Communications, Uhn Jun Gwan; Medical Officer, Lee Kyong Sae; 1st Battalion CO, Mok Yong Soll; 2d Battalion CO, Chang Ha San; 3d Battalion CO, Kwon Yong Ho.

Another and recent operation, the Tong-nam-myon raid, lasted for three days, 29 October to 1 November 1952. In this action we killed 410 NKA, destroyed 100 oxcarts, captured 30 oxen and some rifles. Friendly strength was 250 men. The details have not yet been reported. This was our latest reported operation. There were eleven friendly KIA

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and thirteen wounded. There have been two other recent operations which have not yet been reported. So much for the partisan fighting.

The three mottos are still living in our hearts. On each island where my unit is, there are primary schools and the teachers are my men. They teach small children, refugee and local children.

Before, we used to have a middle school on Yong-ho-do and a branch on Chang-lin-do and I had my partisans go to the middle school and continue to study when they are not fighting. At present, I am not able to have my people go to school regularly, but I am having them keep several books near them to read and study by themselves in their quarters. Also I am planning to make arrangements with some middle school in Inchon to set up a branch on Ohwa-do and have school teachers come to teach my partisans. Eventually I would like to have my partisans get a middle school diploma.

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THE NARRATIVE OF MR KIM CHANG SONG,
LEADER OF DONKEY 13 [1]

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[1] Mr Kim Chang Song, Leader of Donkey 13, was interviewed 1030-1200, 3 November 1952, by Lt Col A. S. Daley and Maj B. C. Mossman, assisted by PFC Andrew Chisarick as stenographer, and 1st Lt Cho Byung Chan, ROKA, as interpreter.

I have just lately joined the unit, but I have been in relation to the Donkey operation since the very beginning. I am the old man in the unit. I would like to tell you how the Donkey unit was started and organized.

This unit was organized from North Korea, not from the island. The anti-Communists who went into North Korea to fight Communism there were disappointed to see the United Nations Forces as well as the ROK forces retreating as far as the Naktong River. We thought the situation was hopeless. Then we started thinking there was a hope when the United Nations Forces were coming up north again, bombing North Korean cities and killing North Korean Army soldiers and policemen. It was the best news for us to hear that the United Nations Forces would not abandon Korea. It was good news to hear they would help Korea out in fighting Communism and also to see the UN Forces advancing into North Korea.

We expected to see them arrive in our home town area sooner or later, but before we met the United Nations Forces we thought what we should do to meet them. There was a great difficulty with our decision, which was to fight against Communism. The difficulty was Kim Il Sung's policy which was to draft every young man in North Korea and have him join the North Korean Army or have him go to the mines and work as a laborer. As a result of that policy, there was no chance for us to be organized as a certain group. We could not get a chance to make a group of anti-Communist youth in North Korea. The only thing we could do was

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to escape from the draft and remain alive until the United Nations Forces arrived at our home town. It was a time when we studied an escape from our homes and our families and how to go in hiding in the mountainous area.

I, who was one of the anti-Communist youth in the area, was on a consistent watching of North Korean Government because right after the 1945 liberation from the Japanese regime I made some anti-Communist movements in North Korea and was put in prison. I was in prison for 3 years. I managed an orchard in North Korea before I was put into prison. When the North Koreans invaded South Korea, it was critical for me to move my home, because sooner or later they would put me into jail again. So I escaped to the Un-yu area. At that time the only thing we could do with our lives was to escape from the Communists. The story which I just told you is only the story of myself. I was just one of the anti-Communist youths who escaped.

It was considered not wise to escape without leaving any men of my side in that town. We had to watch what the town would do. It was my policy to watch through a doctor and a teacher in the school. I had told the doctor to give a false diagnosis on the young men in draft age. For instance, to say that that man has bad arches, flat feet, and also that that man has bad lungs or bad sight and they couldn't pass the physical to go to the North Korean Army. Those young people could stay in town without having to escape to the mountains. I worked through the teacher in school to be recommended that some of the students who were quite important to the school to us that they not be drafted but to continue their studies. The chief schoolmaster would approve the recommendations and the young men would stay in school. The rest of the young people who didn't have any reason not to be drafted had to escape and they went into the mountainous area and stayed in hiding.

There was another great difficulty for us in hiding. The difficulty was the eating problem in the mountain area because we didn't

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have enough grain to eat since the Communist government confiscated all grains from us under the name of the spot-tax material act, and I had to have some means to eat. I worked through the manager of some small local bank to keep the documents on my house in the bank as a mortgage on the house. Eight of us gave the documents to the bank and we got 800,000 Won from the bank. We used that as a confidential fund. The ratio of Won at that time was 1 North Korean Won to 4 South Korean Won. One small mal of rice cost 300 Won in North Korea at that time. About 100,000 Won was considered a great deal of money then. With the money which I got, I bought a radio and I obtained some batteries from one of my friends who worked for an electrical company, and I went into the Un-yu mountainous area and listened for news.

I was listening every night and every day and was familiar with the United Nations Forces frontlines and I heard the United Nations Forces arrived at Nanchon. It was on 6 October 1950. Knowing the UN Forces arrived at Nanchon, I started a movement from the mountains for my people.

I put out an order to the high school boys in my home town to be ready to fight when the United Nations Forces approached my town, and I also put out an order to the merchants in the market who were not watched very closely by the Communists, and told them to prepare themselves for fighting which would be taking place in the near future. On 9 October when I was still listening to the radio, the North Korean Army, troops they called the "self-guard body," which consists of pure enthusiastic Communists (they were members of the Communist Party in Korea), and some North Korean policemen, gathered in the area where I was hiding. I was surprised to see the enemy, the North Korean Army soldiers and the policemen concentrated in Un-yu, which was located near Chinnamp'o, because it was after the Inchon landing took place and so I thought our Allies were going to land at Chinnamp'o.

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On the night of 10 October I went back to Shin-chon (Sinch'on), my home town, in a great hurry. I found when I went back that there were no North Korean Army soldiers in town and only a few policemen and some of the self-guard body. That was what I heard from the high school boys who were working under me as an anti-Communist band. I thought they were the people concentrated at the Un-yu area and I thought it was the best chance to arise against the enemy. I kept obtaining information through my friendly people. I found it was not because United Nations Forces were going to land at Chinnamp'o that the enemy was concentrated at Unyu. The United Nations Forces were advancing in North Korea and the enemy could no longer stay there and had to escape and go to Ku-wol-san.

First of all, I had to gather some weapons to fight the enemy and it was very difficult to get the weapons. I was lucky to get five North Korean Army soldier uniforms and caps and I had those five uniforms put on my men so that they would be disguised in North Korean uniforms. We ambushed the NKA on the road between Chinnamp'o and Ku-wol-san. There was an NKA truck with some men, one of whom was driving, and we had our five men stop the truck and they were talking back and forth and back and forth with the enemy. Then three of us hit and killed them.

One of my men drove the truck back to Chinnamp'o into a house and unloaded the weapons from the truck. We obtained 108 Russian rifles. We oiled those rifles overnight on 12 October 1950. I had all my people who were hiding in the ceilings of houses, in the fields, and in the mountains gather at one place. I had them take positions in each important place. I mean the place where we can hide ourselves and we expected the enemy might come through the area. I had my people ambush each important place. I sent a message to our friendly people at Chae-ryong, which was 12 kilometers from Shin-chon, and told them to be ready to take an action in the morning of 13 October. The schedule of time for opening fire was 9 o'clock in the morning, 13 October, and I had

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news that the UN Forces reached Haeju. There was no doubt that the news was happy to us. It was prospective that the UN Forces would arrive in my home town while we were in an engagement with the Communist forces, and I hoped this to come true.

At 9 o'clock on 13 October we attacked the enemy police station. We started opening fire at 9 o'clock and the fire fighting lasted until 1 o'clock in the morning of 14 October. When we started fighting the civilians in the town made torch lights, which in North Korea means that something is against you, sort of a warning. They piled sticks and wood up and made a big bonfire in Shin-chon. Because of this we knew there were Communist there.

Even recalling that time I am getting excited!

We had information from Chiri-won that the Communists started moving at 2 o'clock on 14 October. This was the time we could see Shin-chon and Chiri-won (? Charahyon set (YC2144)) from the light of the bonfires. Approximately 3 o'clock in the morning of 14 October, one UN airplane came overhead. Before that they had bombed the area, but that night they didn't. We thought the plane was aware of the friendly people's resistance against the Communists because they didn't bomb us. Our fighting spirit was kept in the best degree and we kept fighting. By 12 o'clock the next day we occupied the enemy police station. We couldn't occupy the police station at first, so we poured gasoline into a beer bottle and we fired it at the police station. It burned down completely. The enemy was forced to move out of the police station when it was being burned.

As soon as they moved out, we rushed into it before it was completely burned down, and we found 80 anti-Communist youths in jail. We opened the door and we released them from the jail. There was a big air-raid shelter in the back yard of the station and we found about 150 corpses of the friendly people who were killed by the Communists for two days. The corpses which we found made us cruel, our blood hot. Any Communists

we found in town, we just killed them. Next day we occupied the main office of the labor Party. We burned down the so-called political defense bureau station and law court detachments and other organizations. We had completely occupied the Shin-chon area after the fighting. We lost about 100 friendly people in the fight. The motive for the slaughter taking place in the area of Communists and North Korean Army soldiers was the corpses that we found in the back yard of the police station. We killed every Communist we found and a great slaughter had taken place. The people in that area were embodied with the spirit of slaughter.

Two days later we had information that the enemy was coming from Haeju with 22 trucks. We were well armed now and we had ammunition enough to fight the enemy coming from Haeju. We no longer tried to escape from the town and prepared to fight the enemy. Four friendly jet planes came over our heads when we were fighting the enemy from Haeju. The frontline was 1 kilometer from us. The four friendly jets were over us and started strafing the enemy side, which led the operation to a great success. I think that the reason that they struck at that side was that there was a great number of civilians on our side and soldiers in uniforms who were yelling "Banzai" (Mansei) in Korean, and the sight of the North Korean flag and combat troops also led to this attack by the jet planes. All this happened on the afternoon of 15 October, about 4 o'clock.

In that fighting we captured 13 enemy trucks; the rest of the trucks were destroyed in the fight. We captured a lot of heavy machine guns and rifles. We captured the chief committeeman of the province. We also captured 23 North Korean Army prisoners and one Russian woman. The Russian woman was treasurer of a theater and was escaping in a car with the provincial committeeman. She had a baby with her that was very little at the time. I can't remember her name.

I thought the Russian woman and the chief commissar was quite a good prize as they were not like ordinary POWs but were political prisoners. We kept them until the UN forces arrived and I turned them over to them.

On 17 October 1950 a UN plane came over our heads and dropped a letter to us. The letter was written in English and was wrapped in a yellow bag. It read, "You people in this town liberated this town by yourselves. We recognize this. However, there are enemies all around your town. Our United Nations Forces are in Haeju and Sariwon."

On 19 October UN Forces arrived in my town without any fighting at all. It was the 187th. We the people of Shin-chon-gun were liberated from the Communist oppressor! When the first troops came in that area the next day, there was a unit which looked pretty tough and had about 20 jeeps, 20 trucks, and some tanks, and they took all the weapons from us. I went to the troops and explained what I had done in the town and I explained we were the loyal people, and I showed him the two prisoners. The troops took the woman with them and turned the chief back to us and we shot him. I asked for the weapons back and after a long talk I got about one third of the weapons back from them.

In all guns in Hwang-hae province the old people rose against Communist forces and fought against them just like us. The NKA couldn't do much against the people who were against Communism. They all escaped to the Ku-wolsan area. Thus the province was taken by UN Forces without severe fighting because of the people who fought against the Communists.

The UN Forces kept going up north. The man in command of the local troops was a lieutenant colonel, and he appointed the people who were to be the chiefs of guns and chiefs of police stations of each gun. I was appointed chief of the police station of Shin-chon-gun. Since that time I was in charge of the police station and served in the field of security and order. On 10 December 1950, until when I was chief of the police station, the UN Forces had started going down south, and I was

not familiar with the situation and I did not know what was going on. So I just remained in the town with my people. We were still fighting against the enemy. We heard that there was a lot of CCF and NKA coming down through the district again and that the UN Forces had retreated past Seoul. On 20 December the last battle took place between my people and the North Korean Army come back from Ku-wol-san where they had been hiding, plus the NKA came from the north. We left the area with the weapons we had and came out to the island of Paengnyong-do on 20 December 1950. We didn't take any of our families with us. About 1,700 of us came here by 6 January 1951. The reason why I didn't take my family was because no one else did since we heard the UN Forces were coming back in two months.

I found that the young people on the island came from all districts and were all anti-Communist. They numbered about 4,000. We who came down here wondered what was going to happen to our future.

On 20 January there was a First Lieutenant Harrison, the first commanding officer of the island, who was getting help from the ROK Navy that organized this Donkey unit. We joined the Donkey unit headquarters. We didn't know in the first place actually what the Donkey was. We understood that they were going into the mainland with radio and obtaining information on the enemy and sending this information to Donkey headquarters and fighting on the mainland as guerrillas.

I organized Donkey 1 with 37 men. The first group which was Donkey 1 was trained for about 20 days for communications and demolition jobs. On 3 March 1951 they were first sent to the mainland with radio and they went to Shin-chon, which was their home town, and they were in hiding on Turasan, a mountain. It was the very beginning of the Donkey unit. Then after Donkey 1, Donkeys 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were organized. They were the first Donkeys in the first part of this operation. Several of us had agreed with the name Tang-na-gwi because the generator of the ANCR radio looked like a Korean donkey or ass. When you crank the

[redacted] generator of the radio you have to ride on the generator which looks like a rider on the back of a donkey. That is the reason why we call them "Donkey" units.

After Donkey 1 went to the mainland, I had Donkey 4 land on the mainland as the second unit. I also recommended present Donkey 11 to be an organized unit which would be a Donkey unit. I also recommended present Donkeys 2 and 9 to be Donkey units. So did I for Donkey 10. I helped the people to organize Donkey 5. I had quite a few people of Donkey 5 belong to me. Lieutenant Harrison was a good friend of mine and he trusted me very much. He listened to my recommendations and I recommended those units to him to be organized as Donkey units. All of my people, about 1,700 strong, had joined Donkey units except about 300 of them.

Thirty-seven people of Donkey 1, which was the first unit to go on the mainland, were discovered by the enemy on the mainland. Five of them, including the present Donkey 1 leader, had safely returned to this base. They had been on the mainland five months. After that, Donkey 1 leader requested the commanding officer of Leopard base to permit him to reorganize Donkey 1. The Donkey 1 leader reorganized Donkey 1 with 150 people after permission had been granted. Since then, Donkey 1 unit has killed approximately 270 enemy, captured approximately 30 more, Donkey 1 has lost approximately 50 people killed. Those Donkey 1 people, as I previously related, are my men. Also, my people are fighting as Donkeys in other Donkey units.

Now we will go to my present Donkey 13 unit. I have a great reason for not being a Donkey so far in spite of that I have had 300 people directly under me. When this operation was started, there was a navy here on this island with approximately 100 Korean Marine Corps. One hundred people were not enough strength to defend this island. In view of the unit strength, my people were recommended to be the defense unit. Therefore I have been under ROK Navy when they were here and KMC when

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they took defense mission from the navy. I have given my people, whom I consider good for intelligence activity or guerrilla activity on mainland, to those Donkey units. My people wanted to join them for a long time; however, I have been under political pressure from the ROK Navy and KMC. The other Donkey leaders didn't like me because I was under ROK Navy. We were organizing guerrilla forces in defense forces. We were offensive and wanted to join the Donkeys on the mainland as guerrillas. Last August we first got permission to be a Donkey and became Donkey 13.

Finally, on 20 October 1952, I could get 200 people who had been volunteer corps under KMC released from KMC officially, despite KMC reluctance to release them. Now I have 600 people under me. Returning to my old job with my people as guerrillas, I am self-confident that I should be able to produce a lot of results of operations as well as accurate intelligence activities on the mainland. The base of Donkey 13 is Sun-wi-do. Although my unit has not been too old as a Donkey, I am proud of one thing which I have performed for these four months, since I became a Donkey. The performance is an information of enemy general headquarters in Pyongnyang and numerous organizations under the general headquarters and POW camps in that area obtained by my people. I have spread about 100 people in my unit in the whole area of Pyong-na-nam-do and Hwang-hae-do. I have a strong and good cell net established with which I shall be able to do my job well.

These are what I have done in the past and my plan of what I will do in the future, and I swear in front of you that I will do my best for the sake of unity of my motherland, and freedom of my brothers in this country, taking orders from the commanding officer of the Leopard base.

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THE NARRATIVE OF MR. KIM UNG SOO, LEADER OF DONKEY 15[1]

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[1]Mr Kim Ung Soo, Leader of Donkey 15, was interviewed 1000-1200, 1320-1530, 5 November 1952, by Lt Col A. S. Daley, and Maj B. C. Mossman, on a western coastal island. The interpreter was 1st Lt Cho Byung Chan, ROKA.

I finished Japanese-sponsored primary school in Manchuria during the Japanese regime. I also finished Manchol Middle School there. I completed a four-year course at the Manchurian National Third Higher School. I had a job at the Manchurian Central Bank. After six months at the bank, I went to China and became a propagandist under a Japanese Army intelligence organization which was in China. I returned to my home town, Sinuiju, in 1943. The same year I was drafted into the Japanese Army and I joined the Japanese 65th Division. The division was in China until the 15 August 1945 liberation -- actually until 26 September 1945, because for a time the division was not aware of the Japanese surrender. While I was in the Japanese Army, I finished a special course in preliminary officer candidate school. After the Japanese Army was disarmed in China there was a Korean organization named the Hang-guk-kyo-min-dan.[2] There are numerous groups called by this same

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[2] An organization of Koreans in China.

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name. I was appointed Chief of the General Affairs Section of the group located in Hai-ju.

On 1 May 1946 I landed at Pusan. Then I crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea to return to my native town where my parents were still living. Three days after I arrived at my home town, the North Korean police put me in jail because I was once a member of the Japanese Army. I was in jail for a week. I had then stayed at my home for about ten

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days and again I was called by the police and was detained for two days for further investigation. After I was released from the Jail I became a teacher in a Catholic school, called Song-shim School, until April 1947. My family was Catholic. In April 1947 I crossed the 38th parallel to South Korea because the Communist's watching of me had been very severe while I was in my home town. After I crossed the 38th parallel I had a job with the Northwest Youth Group in Seoul.

When the Communist's Army invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, I returned to Pusan. By chance I had joined the ROK Army as a civilian. I became the Sinuiju Detachment Chief for the reason that I had finished the Manchurian school and I spoke Chinese. The mission of the detachment was to operate in Manchuria obtaining information from that area.

As the UN forces advanced into North Korea, I had also advanced to North Korea. At Chongju, I met UN forces retreating from north to south. Chongju was on the way to Sinuiju, which was the destination of my detachment. At Chongju I was separated from my people and became a straggler. I gathered the loyal youths in Chongju and organized a band which was similar to an army force. This is the cradle of my partisan life.

I established a command post of the armed force, which consisted of the young loyal anti-Communist youth, in the Chongju area. The command post was called a joint-operation CP and I was selected as commanding officer. Starting from the middle part of November 1950, the band operated as partisans in each myon. The CCF, however, mopped up so severely that we had to evacuate the Chongju region and we returned to Aedo-dong in the first part of December 1950. At that time I had 180 people. That is the reason I called that unit the Aedo Unit. It was a severe winter and with the water frozen up we were unable to come down to the south. Therefore we had made our minds up to hold the island to the last minutes. There were two defensive operations. Finally in the latter part of February 1951, we had inevitably to retreat from the island because we were unable to capture any weapons, ammunition,

[redacted] or food from the mainland, about which we could not learn information.

For the purpose of obtaining some weapons, ammunition, and food, we retreated to Cho-do. There is an interesting story about our arrival at Cho-do. We had no idea who was on Cho-do at that time. Before we actually landed at Cho-do we were in a fire fight with the people on Cho-do. Later we found they were an intelligence unit which was called Oceanic Operation Corps under KLO. KLO was then not belonging to the same headquarters as now. Also at that time we received shells from ROK Navy Ship Number 303 which supported the people on the island with their gunfire. However, the ridiculous fight, which was accidental was stopped after a while. After our arrival on Cho-do we obtained information of all the area around Cho-do and for the first time we could see the general picture of the state of the war.

In order to operate as a partisan unit, we joined the Yon-pung Unit which came out of the Ku-wol-san area (the present Donkey 20). When my Aedo Unit joined the Yon-pung Unit, the Yon-pung Unit changed its name to Ku-wol Unit because it was going to be operating in the Ku-wol-san region. The Aedo Unit became the 3d Regiment of the Ku-wol Unit. In the middle part of March 1951, we moved to Sok-to. The present Donkey 7 was also originally a part of the Ku-wol Unit.

The original unit and my people had first performed a guerrilla operation on the mainland on or about 27 March 1951. We first landed on the mainland and occupied Won-du-san Hill for two days and two nights. The results of the operation by the 1st Battalion, 3d Regiment, which had forty men, is as follows: surprised one enemy heavy weapons company; killed eighty NKA Troops; captured twenty-eight NKA Troops; captured one Maxim heavy machine gun; captured five antitank machine guns; two Russian light machine guns, and some rifles. Thus the Aedo Unit started to be well-known in the Cho-do and Sok-to area. Three enemy battalions were mobilized to reinforce the enemy punitive forces in the Won-du-san neighborhood and we had to retreat to Ung-do.

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To take a rest we came down to Sok-to. Until that time, the Ku-wol Unit had no direct contact with Major Burke, who was the commanding officer of Leopard Base on Paen-yong-do, even though Captain Kim[3], who

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[3]Now major, ROKA. Kim was figured in the development of the partisan resistance.

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was the original leader of the Ku-wol Unit, had been visiting him quite often.

In the first part of April 1951, we attacked an enemy position in the vicinity of So-hae-ri. In this operation we killed twenty and captured one. Until this time we had seriously lacked weapons and ammunition. In order to capture some, one of my brave company commanders had run toward the enemy for hand-to-hand combat and was killed before he could possibly reach the position.

In the middle part of April we were again on the mainland and in an engagement with the enemy.

We heard Major Burke of Leopard sent one first lieutenant to Sok-to to coordinate all guerrilla forces in the area. Also, Major Burke sent a message to us requesting us to come down to Paen-yong-do. The 3d Regiment was separted from the Ku-wol Unit to come down to Paen-yong-do. After a month's training in demolitions and communications on Paen-yong-do under Leopard, we received weapons, ammunition, food, and a radio from Leopard headquarters as an independent Donkey unit with the name Donkey 15. Thus Donkey 15 was born.

About thirty people were trained on Paen-yong-do. They were more or less representative of my unit. Becoming Donkey-15 with supplies from this CP, I took the thirty men to Sok-to and gathered all my people and left for Tae-hwa-do and landed at Tae-hwa-do as was suggested by Major Burke. Also it was suggested to me by Major Burke that I send my people to the mainland to obtain necessary information and to operate as guerrillas. I had landed at Tae-hwa-do the latter part of May 1951

and soon after I had landed at So-hwa-do. A week after landing at Tae-hwa-do, I had information that there was a big enemy warehouse located at Shin-mi-do. Therefore, I raided it on 7 June 1951. To state the results briefly, we fought a CCF company and killed sixty men, captured six, and captured 5,000 bags of grain. Also, there were 300 head of oxen on the island. Until that time we were not sure whether it was legal or illegal to capture enemy oxen, even though we were partisans, so we just captured twenty oxen.

In order to operate on the mainland, it was essential to establish a cell net, also to agitate in the enemy rear area. In the first place, I had sent one detachment to Wae-sun-do and we had landed at Ka-do, Tan-do, Ka-cha-do to operate from these islands. After we had secured those islands we had started sending our partisans and our agents to the mainland. Those partisans and agents had started sending information of the enemy on mainland back to the islands.

I had an Operation Corps in my unit. Its mission was to operate in the region of Chongju and An-ju as guerrillas. The mission of the Ka-cha-do detachment was to establish AGIT on the route to Chongju and An-ju area. By the efforts of the Ka-cha-do detachment we were able to first send a guerrilla group with seventy-two men, led by Kim Chon Il, to Ku-bong-san in the first part of August 1951. They had an ANGRC-9 radio with them.

The Wae-sun-do detachment had mainly tried to rescue the loyal youth in hiding on the mainland in the area of Chongju, Dok-an-myon, An-ju, andChong-chon-gang. While they had been operating in this region as guerrillas, they had rescued approximately one hundred loyal youth.

There was a mine on the mainland right across from Ka-do and Ka-cha-do. It was a monazite mine.[4] The laborers at the monazite mine were

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[4]It has been reported from time to time that this strategic material is being shipped to an unknown destination in the USSR. For example, see G-2, staff section report, EUSAK, August 1952, Narrative, p. 7. 122

people who had assisted the United Nations forces when they advanced into their area and who were unable to escape when the Communists returned. Therefore the detachment on Ka-do and Ka-cha-do had established an agent cell net in the vicinity of the mine and through this cell net they had rescued a good portion of the some 10,000 laborers and sent them to the island. Thus my unit had kept growing bigger and bigger. (As of the latter part of August 1951, my unit had increased from three hundred, which was the strength of Donkey-5 when it landed at Tae-hwa-do, to seven hundred.) Meanwhile other parties of guerrillas had been harassing mine transport between the mine and Chol-san, cutting the road and attacking the vehicles, capturing the minerals.

Also, forty-two people with one ANGR-9 radio were sent to Chon-du-san near to Sinuiju in the latter part of September 1951. From the time when my unit had first landed at Tae-hwa-do to the last of September 1951, we had captured about eighty prisoners, including those who had deserted to us. I cannot remember exact dates and exact summary of operations which took place somewhere almost every day.

In the first part of October 1951, one American lieutenant and one American NCO were sent to my unit as advisers. Frankly, I do not know whether the CP considered the operation in the northern part of the peninsula was important, or my unit was not capable enough for the important operations. I hope it was the former.

After the two American advisers joined my unit all of us in the unit were operating as guerrillas on the mainland quite actively. Before I relate war stories to you, I would like to introduce one of my brave company commanders. The company commander is still alive and is working for my unit now. His name is Lee Tae Gu. About the middle part of October 1951, we had information that some Russian inspectors were working at the monazite mine mentioned above. Lee Tae Gu had left our island base with fifty-eight men for the purpose of capturing the Russians. However, they were discovered by one CCF company which was on the way to

the Russians' location. They reacted by assaulting the CCF company CP, and capturing a CCF soldier and a radio. The company commander received grenade fragmentation wounds in six places.

In the first part of November 1951, Lieutenant Kestlinger was sent to my unit, and also in mid November 1951 Ka-do was strafed by enemy Yak planes. In the latter part of November 1951 we received instructions from the CP that higher headquarters needed one CCF prisoner from the west-coast area. The CCF PW was the first CCF captured by a Donkey unit. On 14 November 1951, an enemy regiment captured Ka-do. At that time those islands which were occupied by friendly partisans had been bombed almost every night by enemy night bombers, what we call "tombo." * On

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*AUTHOR'S NOTE: a dragon fly.

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15 November 1951, eleven bombers and eight MIG jets had come over our heads on Tae-hwa-do and swept the whole village dropping bombs and strafing. We suffered sixty killed and 122 wounded. We later learned that one enemy division was preparing to drive us from those islands. A part of the division attacked Tan-do about a week after the bombing of Tae-hwa-do. At that time still enemy bombers escorted by fighters came over our heads and strafed and bombed. On 31 November 1951, around 1700 enemy bombers and fighters attacked Tae-hwa-do again. About 2100 that night two enemy regiments landed at Tae-hwa-do under cover of gunfire from a neighboring island and from ships and airplanes. Despite this overwhelming fire, we desperately fought them for three hours, but I lost most of my main body on the island, although about two hundred were evacuated. With us at the time were one British army captain and one British naval officer, one American NCO, one American officer, Lieutenant Allan, and one British navy enlisted man. In the action all of these except Lieutenant Allan were killed or captured. I regrouped my defeated people on Tae-chong-do, giving them the necessary rest so that their fighting spirit might be recovered.

Since we were bitterly defeated by the enemy on the island last year we had lost much of our equipment, and also we compromised our partisans' locations on the mainland because some of my people were captured on the island. My partisans on the mainland suffered many large-scale enemy mopping-up operations. And I had been unable to make contact with them for a long time. Last summer when I went back to the area I had my agents try to find out where these people were. Finally I found forty-seven survivors out of seventy-two Ku-bong-san detachment people were still alive and they had recently moved their location from Ku-bong-san to Oh-bong-san. Now we come to operations of this year.

With my people who recovered their fighting spirits from defeated broken hearts, I had landed at Un-mu-do for the first time in this year, last May. Mainland guerrilla operations had taken place in the area of Chong-chon-gang as far as Chongju. This time Captain Kestlinger and Lieutenant Mapp were with us for about two months. In order to move to Tae-hwa-do again we first sent a reconnaissance party to the island. There the reconnaissance party found and brought back an American colonel whose jet plane had been shot down. He had been stranded on Tae-hwa-do for about thirty days.[5] After that we occupied Uri-do and Cham-chae-do.

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[5]The USAF colonel was Albert W. Schintz. A partial account of his adventure appeared in Life, 28 July 1952.

During these days I lost about thirty men, and now my people were operating from Nap-som. My present strength is about 150 men.

I have been with my people on any raids or operations, in which my unit has been concerned, from the islands. I cannot tell you what my people have done on the mainland because I have not been with them. They have been destroying enemy transportation routes, raiding enemy transportation and cutting railroad tracks. However, I would like to

relate the story of an operation which had taken place on Aedo without our previous purpose -- the operation was not purposely performed.

I deeply felt that the guerrilla forces were entirely different from regular army troops. Regular army troops are well equipped, which guerrilla forces are not. The most difficult thing for guerrilla forces is to defend and hold ground. The easiest thing for guerrillas is to attack. It is related in the principles of guerrilla warfare.

I had stayed on Aedo for about three months and the first month I had never received any enemy shells from the mainland, but the last two months I received from forty to sixty rounds -- sometimes more than one hundred -- from the coast daily. About one month after I landed at Aedo one enemy company had started marching toward the island during daylight when the tide was out. All of my men, as I ordered, held their fire until the enemy was 500 meters from us. We had to save our ammunition because at that time each of my men had only thirty rounds. Therefore we must not shoot a round without hitting an enemy. The enemy, equipped with mortars and all other good weapons, could not come on the island.[6]

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[6] Author's Note: A feature of the Korean Yellow Sea Coast is the unusually extensive foreshore. At low tide wide expanses are left bare or awash, and a number of islands can then be reached on foot from the mainland.

Next is the operation of which I am most proud even now. I am very happy to mark the story in the history of my unit because it was one of their most efficient and victorious small operations. By comparison more enemy were killed in this small action than in big one. The action took place a week after the first attack on Aedo had failed. This time one whole battalion had started approaching my island in three groups, firing mortars and other heavy weapons. My people immediately took up positions to hold the ground. It was a time when we were to kill or be killed. Considering the success of our previous defense and our shortage

of ammunition, I ordered my troops to hold fire until the attackers were within 100 meters. As they closed in, wading or coming up the beach, we opened with a volley. The ensuing fight continued for three hours. There were the following reasons why the enemy troops, despite their numbers, could not step on the island defended only by a few of us with none too much ammunition. In the first place, there was only one passage way to my island when the tide was low. Secondly, they were on the beach or in the shallow water where they were showing all their bodies, but we were on the ground and we could hide ourselves behind rocks and in holes. Thirdly, we did not fire until they were close to us and we started fire by volley which hit exactly every one of them. In an instant the enemy lost many people. Three hours after the fire fight started the tide started coming in. The survivors were drowned. When the tide went out we could count some four hundred corpses. Also we plundered the food which they intended to eat on my island and took their ammunition, which we badly needed. We captured mortars and antitank guns. Thus the battle led to a historic and glorious victory. It took place on or about 27 December 1950. We had about 180 men then.

The 180 men could defeat 400 well-equipped troops for another reason. My men were absolutely obedient to their commander's orders. The order observed by the men prevented the landing and led to a glorious success. We lost thirteen men killed.

Besides this there are many operations in which I cannot remember exactly. Most of them were done at night.

I had one man who I was not aware was an enemy agent for two months. Then I found out. Originally the guerrillas were organized by people who came from the same district. If you have a friend come from the same neighborhood you can tell because you are familiar with him. When we have outsiders come we are not sure. We have a cell net in the unit. The cell net is composed of real trustworthy people and they will track

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the man whom in the meantime we let go from the unit. Sooner or later we can discover whether the man is an enemy agent or not. Also when I suspected a man, I did not kill him, but transferred him to a job where he could not endanger the unit. There he was constantly watched until he was proved guilty or cleared. So far we have had about ten cases of suspected enemy agents.

When I had about 1,000 or more people under me, I also had a Chief of Staff who assisted me to control my unit. The Chief of Staff was entitled to control the unit instead of me or assisting me sometimes. However, for security reasons, the agent organization, special and important, and the military discipline section belonged to me -- nobody else. They did not take orders from the Chief of Staff. I as commanding officer, personally supervised them. Such a way is the only method with which you can protect the unit from being invaded by enemy agents.

It was my policy to have the staff officers take direct orders from me and also to have staff officers have their own cell nets in my own unit. Thus these cell nets and the agent section members used to be watching constantly every member of my unit. If any of them has changed his thought or if anyone came from outside to the unit with unrest ideas, he will be found out. In that way you have closer check on enemy agents. Also, the fewer staff officers who know your operational plans, the better. The more people who know what you are going to do, the more chance the enemy may learn about it.

Now for the military discipline officer. It was my policy to give special privileges to the military discipline officer. The military discipline section performs a function similiar to that of the agent section. Therefore I give the military discipline officer the same standing as t he other staff officers so that he can do his work without interference even if it crosses another staff officers' sphere. He takes orders and reports information directly to me. This avoids delay caused by sending his reports through the staff and also fewer hands can

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touch them. It is my motto to know what is going to happen before it happens. Furthermore, and for similar reasons, I keep the communications section directly under me. No message goes out without my approval. I control the Communication.

We have not been able to distribute large amounts of grain or food to the civilians. We would like to but once we do that a civilian who received the grain will be shot by the enemy. We would rather lose the friendship of the civilians than have them killed. Sometimes it is okay to give out a small amount of grain secretly.

Are families of partisans ever abused by the Reds? Sometimes they kill the families. But it is quite seldom. Yet they often confiscate property and personal fortune of such families and drive the families from the town where they had been living and scatter them, making them roam around begging for food.

Question: Are there people in North Korea farther north who would form bands if we were able to supply them up there with equipment or if the UN troops began to approach that area? -- Here is a story about the question. With Lt Kestlinger, my people had landed at a certain place near my home town and captured one civilian who was my neighbor. That man was a rich man. That man was quite a gentlemen, so I thought I could trust him. We had that man as a guide into the area where we wanted to surprise the enemy. When we reached that place, the man escaped. Thus we failed to surprise the enemy because we were discovered by them. Nevertheless, considering that fact, I think that two thirds of the people between Chinnampo and the Yalu will be friendly; at least they won't be operating against us. One third of them, some of whom will be the real Communists and some of whom will be of the ignorant class who are always the first to follow, will try to escape to Manchuria in order to stay away from the UN forces.

What we think about <u>enemy</u> partisans: One of these days we may be able to take the country as far as the Yalu River from enemy hands.

[redacted] Still there will be enemy partisans operating from Pak-tu-san, one of the highest mountains. It is a long ridge connected to the Manchurian ridges. We will be bothered by partisans operating from that area for a while.

There are some other friendly guerrillas operating up there -- a lot of them are not connected with us. I have heard and know the location of bands of CCF soldiers who are making trouble against the CCF. Most of the people making trouble against the Communists are such people as young people who cooperated with the UN forces, and got rid of many Communists while the UN forces occupied those areas. When the UN retreated they could not get out. So they went to the mountains. Now they have made up their minds to stay in the area because they will be killed anyway if they go to their towns. So they stay in the mountains and fight, though with few weapons. There are quite a few deserted CCF soldiers--most of them deserted when their units were going back from the line to Manchuria.

Thirty percent of these deserters are active anti-Communists. Such people are actively making movements to hit the Communists as their enemy. Seventy percent of them are anti-Communists but are not active. These latter just deserted from the enemy. If they went home they would be suppressed by Communist rule, and if they went to the front lines they would be killed. They wait for UN forces to come back. I am not sure what I heard on Tae-hwa-do, however, I last heard there were about 4,000 CCF deserters. I have sent several letters in Chinese to get contact with them, but in vain. They are organized in bands. It is true that they operate at least against the Communists to get food. They will raid enemy transportation convoys to capture food and clothes.

My unit has five mottos. First we are guerrilla forces. We will fight for the freedom until the last life. Second we are free fighters. We will continue fighting until the world's freedom is won. Third we are pioneer patriots and we will be fighting until the final minutes. Fourth we will dedicate our lives to our country. Fifth we will be living with guerrilla spirits and with the spirits of the foundation of our country.

Many of my people are students and there are others from various other occupations.

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THE NARRATIVE OF MR LIM JONG DUK, SUB-LEADER, AND MR LEE BYONG GUN, CHIEF OF STAFF, DONKEY 20 [1]

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[1]Mr Lim Jong Duk and Mr Lee Byong Gun were interviewed by Lt Col A. S. Daley and Maj B. C. Mossman, 0900-1030, 3 November, 1952, on a western coastal island. The interpreter was 1st Lt Cho Byung Chan, ROKA.

Donkey 20 is located in the mountains of Ku-wol-san (YC980630).

After liberation on 15 August 1945 in North Korea I joined the democratic party in North Korea and went underground with the party under the Communist regime. We resisted the Communist government in every way possible. We also had contact with the North Korean Youth Group in South Korea, which consisted of North Koreans who went to South Korea and were under South Korean protection. We resisted the Communists' political and military policies.

Those people who had more than five "chungbu" were forced to move out of the town where they lived. Anti-Communists were under consistent pressure. These anti-Communists had close contact underground with the people in South Korea. Sometimes the movements of the anti-Communists were discovered and even before this war many of our friendly people were killed by the Communists. Most of our anti-Communist movements took place underground. We made pistols and rifles in our secret base underground. We killed North Korean policemen, ambushing and surprising them. We organized students in schools in North Korea who were against Communism. These students helped us drop propaganda leaflets in the classrooms and in the field. We resisted from every direction, attacking, sabotaging, and raiding.

When the war broke out, the Communists made an act called the "Draft Act", which took men under 35 years of age into the North Korean Army.

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The people who didn't like the Communist Army took action and escaped and went into the mountains. They also hid themselves in ceilings and houses and other places of hiding that they could find. They hid for a while and then re-grouped in the mountains. Some had weapons and others didn't. Those people who did have weapons made a systematic fighting force against the Communists. This partisan move took place on 27 June 1950.

Even before the war, anti-Communists in Korea noticed that they were going to start something because of the men coming into North Korea and the equipment that was being built up. It was definite that something big was going to happen when they started the draft into the North Korean Army. So even before this war, quite a few young people crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. Some climbed the hills into the deep mountainous regions to escape the draft.

Right after the Communists invaded South Korea, people in my unit came from a village in Ku-wol-san. We were not organized into a guerrilla band, which means the systematic chain of command. We were organized into a band which was a body of the partisan forces. We were in hiding in the mountains of Ku-wol-san listening to the radio beamed to the United Nations and Communist sides and getting the situation. We knew therefore that UN Forces were coming into North Korea and we were waiting for them. Moreover, we were more or less a band of people which you might call partisans.

On or about 17 or 18 October 1950 the UN Forces advanced into the vicinity and just before they arrived there, we left the mountains and went down to the village and tried to cut the retreating route of the enemy. We surprised them. We had some rifles and that is all. Otherwise we fought with stones, rocks, lumber, bars, and anything we could use. When the UN Forces occupied the district, we became security forces, and we served under them until 5 December 1950. But when the

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UN Forces evacuated the area, we could not evacuate ourselves because we had no transportation. It was very difficult to evacuate everyone under this handicap and, too, the situation became confusing. Some people were captured by the Communists and some escaped into the mountains again. From 5 December 1950 to 21 January 1951 we fought against the Communists Forces in the Ku-wol-san area.

At that time we were no more a group of civilians. We were civilians, but we were fighting against regular Communist forces. We had more weapons than we had when we started; we captured weapons when we cut the retreating route of the enemy, and we received some from the UN Forces. These latter were also enemy weapons, having been captured from the enemy too. We were much better equipped at this time. Notwithstanding, by 21 January we could no longer stay in that place. We made our minds up to leave the mainland for an island. We left a small group on Ku-wol-san to obtain information on the enemy.

On 21 January the main body of our group came out to the island of Ung-do. The waters around there were frozen at the time, that was the reason we could not go down to Paengnyong-do. About 11 March 1951 we first came down to this island from Ung-do and came into contact with Leopard; Major Burke was the commanding officer at that time. Our strength at that time was about 3,700 people. There were seven regiments and the leader of that group was Captain Kim Jong Byok. The seven regiments consisted of a 1st Regiment, 2d Regiment, 3d Regiment, 5th Regiments, 6th Regiments, 7th Regiment, and 8th Regiment. The reason we had no fourth regiment was because Koreans and Japanese believe the number four signifies death and bad luck.

We left the 7th Regiment in Ku-wol-san to operate as partisans. The 1st and 2d Regiments were stationed on Ung-do, where we came out first. The 3rd Regiment was stationed on Sok-to and were in charge of the defense of Sok-to and operated from there. The 5th and 6th Regiments

were in defense of Cho-do. The 8th Regiment was stationed on Churi-ra-do and Pi-do. All this displacement of regiments took place in the first part of March 1951.

The equipment of all of the regiments was as follows: 3 Russian-made 81-mm. mortars, 3 76-mm. guns, which were captured from the enemy, 6 Maxim heavy machine guns, 26 Russian light machine guns, "Chichiloff" (phonetic), 320 PPSH, and 622 Russian rifles. Most of the weapons were captured from the enemy on 8 January 1951 when the United Nations Forces were retreating from North Korea.

On 8 January 1951 the so-called enemy coastal area garrison under the 26th Brigade, IV Corps, had landed at Chae-do to invade Hwang-hae-do. We encountered the landing troops and we almost annihilated them. It was a very successful battle and we captured 32 prisoners! Most of the weapons were captured in this battle. At that time likewise we captured the operations staff officer who was leading that unit. He was one of the 32 prisoners captured by us. The 303d ROK vessel was anchoring near Sok-to and we sent the prisoners on board.

The first difficulty which faced us was the problem of getting ammunition for the weapons we captured from the enemy. We also had difficulty obtaining medicine and other medical supplies. We had no radio at all. The ROK 303d and 304th vessels noticed the guerrilla activities on the island and went back to Pusan and brought back ammunition for the Russian rifles. The ammunition was a present from those ROK Navy men, and in exchange we gave them Russian pistols which the naval personnel liked very much as presents. The 303d and 304th were the first ROK fighting men that we had met after we came out to the island.

Knowing of this Chae-do operation, a heavy machine gun battalion came from Soburi-on 12 January 1951 and the battle between the machine gun battalion and us started from 5 o'clock in the morning. It was a most severe battle and lasted until 8 o'clock in the evening. We just about annihilated the heavy machine gun battalion.

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THE NARRATIVE OF THE LEADER OF THE HONOR GUARD, MR KIM YONG BOK

Mr. Kim Yong Bok, the Leader of the Honor Guard at Leopard Headquarters and sometime Leader of Donkey 3, was interviewed by Lt. Col. A.S. Daley and Maj. B.C. Mossman. The interview took place 1320-1730, 6 November 1952, on a western coastal island. The interpreter was 1st Lt. Cho Byung, ROKA.

I, Kim Yong Bok, finished high school in Manchuria during the Japanese regime in Korea. Also while Korea was ruled by Japan, I entered Seoul Law and Political Institute and when I was a sophomore at the Institute, I was called by the government to the Japanese Army. I was a second-term "student soldier" (student soldiers are considered elite), and I was sent to San-shui-sung (in the Korean language, San-so-song) in China. There I was trained as a first-term trainee. It was training for prospective staff members. After that I entered Sok-ka-jang, China, preliminary officer candidate school as a "learning officer" (probational officer). After graduation from officer candidate school, I was commissioned as a 2d lieutenant in the Japanese Army and returned to my division, which was called the Nobo-ri Division. It was an infantry division. The other name of the division was the 2356 Army Unit.

I served in the Japanese division as an officer until August 15, 1945, when my mother country was liberated from Japanese control. There was a Korean Army Unit in China called the "Revival Army" (more literally, Return to the Light Army) and I became a 2d lieutenant in this Revival Army at Kwang-bok-gun in China. I stayed in the Revival Army for some time and then, in 1946, returned to my mother land, Korea.

When I came back to Korea in 1946, I was with an American, Captain Rosewell. By the favor of the captain I found a job as a clerk in the Department of Foreign Affairs. I was longing so to see my family that I left my job to return to my home town. I crossed the 38th parallel to the north. Until that time neither South nor North Korea were guarding

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the 38th parallel so strictly. Therefore I could go to my family without much trouble.

I am originally from Yong-gang, Pyong-an-nam-do, although for a long time my mother and father and my brothers and sisters were staying in Manchuria. However, when I was called to the Japanese Army, my parents thought that they would see their son no more. Therefore, they left Manchuria to "bury themselves" in their native Korea. Instead of returning to Yong-gang, they went to Changyon, Hong-hae-do. When I came to their home in Changyon, I found my father was dead and that my mother, brothers and sisters were in great trouble earning a living. I was the person obliged to support my family as a householder.

There were many political and social organizations, some of which had been formed and some of which were being organized. All of them were fully communistic (there were Russians in the nearby city) and I found no way to agree with them. Therefore I had kept quiet and tried to be inconspicuous. I became a farmer. In those circumstances I farmed for a year. During these days many Communists interfered with my life, because I was a man who had come up from South to North Korea and also I did not join any particular organization and become an enthusiastic member. Therefore they had constantly kept their eyes upon me. Also, the village we were living in was a very poor village and my mother had quite a few acres of land, which put us in the category of rich landlords by comparison with the poor people in the village. The upshot was, they confiscated our land without payment, but I was not chased out of the village as the really rich landlords were. Also, from time to time I was taken to their organizations for questioning. Thus they had been bothering me in this way and that way, for the sole reason that I was not an enthusiastic member of their group.

Until that time I had heard of Communism, but I had never had any experience in a real Communist society. I first felt that I had lost my freedom, and I had no longer any intention of staying in the Communist

society. While I was staying in the village that year, the Communists started to draft young people.* Therefore, I had to hide myself in the

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*Author's Note: The North Korean draft of all able-bodied men from the age of seventeen to twenty-five was initiated early in 1947.

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mountains. My life in hiding continued from that time until United Nations Forces reached my neighborhood. I went down to the village and became a member of the security forces. I became the chief of the police station detachment in October 1950.

Two months later the United Nations Forces withdrew. Again I fled to hiding in the mountains. While I was hiding in the mountains, which were in my countryside where I had been a police chief, I was able to get food from the village because the enthusiastic Communists who had escaped, had not yet returned. Some of those who were caught in the village when the United Nations Forces had overrun the province, had been executed by us. Therefore, most of the villagers were friendly, or at least not hostile to me. One day one of the villagers told me, in hiding, that NKA troops had ordered them to repair a damaged "wiggly" boat at the beach, and the man told me about when the repairs would be finished. So, in February 1951, myself and another refugee came out to Cho-do in that "wiggly" boat. The boat was so poor and small and beat up that it was falling apart when we reached Cho-do.

I knew the inhabitants of Cho-do were friendly because at that time ROK ships were taking refugees from our province to that island. From Cho-do I came down to Paengnyong-do on or about 28 February 1951. A week later, I met Major Burke, Commanding Officer of Leopard Base.

I had not known Mr Chang Sok Lin, who became the leader of Donkey 4, until that time. When I arrived, I heard Mr Chang was organizing a guerrilla group, so one night I called on him to join his unit. After training was finished, twenty-six of us, including Mr Chang, went to the

mainland with a radio, ten carbines, one Russian light machine gun, thirty Russian rifles and some demolitions. It was 5 March 1951. This was the very beginning of my guerrilla life.

Under the efficient command of the excellent leader, Mr Chang, we were able to stay in Pul-ta-san for about a month. During those days, we obtained information of the enemy in the region. Also, I, personally leading four or five men, had made several attacks, surprising the enemy and killing them, capturing their weapons and food. I was permitted by Mr Chang to be a member of Donkey 4 because I was just recently out of the province. Also, I had rescued quite a few loyal youths there and armed them with captured weapons. Soon after we began operations on the mainland our strength grew to approximately sixty men.

One day, on or about 23 March 1951, early in the morning, I took five men with me and surprised eight NKA soldiers, including one master sergeant, who were supervising civilians digging trenches near O-Dong-Gol. We captured the master sergeant and a private. Even though we had killed quite a few of the enemy by that time, they were our first prisoners. For the first time we could get fresh and living information which accurately pictured the whole enemy situation. Also, I was more familiar with the local countryside there than anyone else. From the information furnished by the prisoners, we first learned there were four thousand NKA troops staying in the villages all around the foot of Pul-ta-san. Knowing two of their men were captured by us, a NK company form Song-chon started searching the very mountain where we were hiding.

Considering the increasing shortage of food and ammunition, I thought it wiser to escape from the area than to fight the enemy regular forces. It would be a hopeless affair for us guerrillas if surrounded. However, Mr Chang, our leader, denied me. Then Mr Chae Hi Hwa, who is the present Donkey 4 sub-leader, advised the leader it would be considered wise to escape. But Mr Chang refused again, saying the vital reason of our being there was to fight the enemy without consideration of danger to our own

lives. We were deeply impressed by the leader's bravery. However, I again urged the leader to escape from the place again saying that I was once a member of regular army forces, but I knew it was a principle of guerrilla forces to attack weak points of the enemy and escape from the enemy, particularly regular forces, when the situation was not absolutely advantageous. Therefore it was of no use to try to fight the regulars with poorly equipped guerrillas. Then, at last, the leader agreed with me.

Until that time we had radio contact with Paengnyong-do. However, it was impossible for us to expect a boat to rescue us from the beach, or an airplane to drop supplies. Therefore we made up our minds to escape on our own. A half of our party scattered all over the mountain to be in hiding again, while thirty of us crossed to the mountain where I had been in hiding before I went to Cho-do. Disguised in North Korean uniforms, some of our members went to the village and ordered the civilians to repair another "wiggly" boat, saying we needed a liaison boat, just as the enemy had done when I was there before. The boat was ready in two days, when we discovered it was not big enough to hold all thirty of us. It could just barely hold twenty of us. (This took place about 28 March 1951.) Therefore, on about 28 March, I decided to stay in the mountains with ten men and the radio, having the rest of the friendlies, including the leader, go out to Cho-do. Shortly afterwards Major Burke let the unit have Wollae-do as an island base.

Mr Chang also acquired authorization from the CP for more strength and equipment. He received a little more than thirty men from the volunteer corps on the island (Donkey 13 men), and for the first time we were issued a weapon new to us, the M1 rifle. Meanwhile I and my little band were still on the mainland waiting for transportation to the island. One day we had a word about a boat visiting a harbor by chance near to us, and so at length we returned to Paengnyong-do to join our main group. It was 6 April 1951, exactly one month and three days after I left Paengnyong-do for the mainland.

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In addition to our base on Wollae island, we set up a headquarters on Yuk-to where we stationed half our strength. With two sail junks we started sending our agents to the mainland for information and also to assist in rescuing the friendlies in hiding there.

Mr Chae Hi Hwa was in charge of the group on Wollae-do and I was operations officer on Yuk-to with the leader Chang. Frankly, operations could not be active those days, so in the first place I poured my main effort on intelligence activity obtaining information. Also, there had been many small skirmishes on a small scale to harass the enemy on the mainland. I stayed on Yuk-to until 20 May 1951.

The original Donkey 3 unit, which was ultimately wiped out, was organized in March 1951. Mr Chang had reached an agreement with the Commanding officer of Leopard Base, Major Burke, to take over Donkey 3. Then in a staff officers' conference at Donkey 4 headquarters I was nominated to be the leader of Donkey 3, which was to be part of Donkey 4. The leader of Donkey 3 was a Mr Lee who, when his unit proved not very successful, gave up his command. Thereafter, twelve of the Donkeys, led by Mr Chae Don Ha, came to Yuk-to with one radio to be subordinated to their new Commanding Officer.

Taking the twelve men and radio, I organized around them a new Donkey 3 unit with thirty-six men. On May 27, 1951, we landed in Hwanghae province and went to Pak-sok-san, where we set up our base. Mr Chang, Donkey 4 leader, had a great belief in me apparently. However, he was kind enough to accompany the new Donkey 3 as far as the Pak-sok-san operations base. He stayed with us there for a week. We started sending to headquarters information about supplies and enemy positions, and ambushing the enemy on the roads. Thus we guerrillas harassed the enemy almost every day.

For instance, On 25 June 1951, Mr Kim Jun Gol, my adjutant, surprised an emeny police station detachment at Un-Yu-myon with ten men. And again, on 14 July 1951, I myself with ten men surprised the enemy at Song-ha-

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on-chon. A few days later we had a little misfortune. My radio broke down on 21 July 1951 and communications between me and Donkey 4 was cut off, and supplies had stopped because the communications through which we had been supported by our headquarters were cut off. I could receive messages from headquarters but not transmit them. The leader Chang just kept talking over his radio informing us of the enemy's movement and arranging a costal rendezvous with alternate plans. Having even one-sided contact with headquarters kept us of peaceful mind and we decided that before we left we would get in another attack. That was our motto! Regrettably while we were planning a surprise, the enemy finally discovered us and I lost three of my good men. These were the first men I had lost.

After receiving some supplies by liaison group from Donkey 4 headquarters, we came out to Cho-do on 26 July 1951. When I met my leader, Mr Chang, I suggested it was wise to have our base on Cho-do rather than to have all the people in the mountains during the coming rainy season. Secondly, we needed some people to stay in the rear and replace the people on the mainland. Another reason, we needed to have an island base near to our operations area. The leader Chang agreed with me, and we also had permission at Leopard Base to have Cho-do as the base for Donkey 3. I had increased my strength as well as equipment up to 200 and started operating from Cho-do.

By that time Donkey 4, Mr Chang, had 400 people under him. He was operating from his island quite actively and I and he were competing as to which unit would produce better results of operations. Both of the units were doing an excellent job as guerrillas, destroying enemy installations, cutting their railroad tracks, ambushing them on roads, and destroying bridges. A comparatively big operation was performed by myself when I led fifteen men to attack Yul-ti-myon.

When I increased my strength to 200, I had several groups of armed people which were not a part, until that time, of any particular organization. One of those groups was led by Mr Chong Song Yong. He had 26

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men under him. Mr Chong Song Yong later became my chief of staff.

Also on or about 29 July 1951, with forty people I had assaulted one enemy company in Pung-chon early in the morning.

I used to come down to Donkey 4 headquarters to meet Mr Chang and talk with him about my operations. At that time mine were more or less combat troops and Donkey 4, Mr Chang, received supplies from the Leopard CP and distributed them out to my unit according to strength. Also at that time, I had captured three sail junks from the mainland. With some other sail junks borrowed from the civilians on my location, I had landed on the mainland very often. Particularly in the autumn I performed operations almost every day. It was the best season to attack the enemy supervising the spot tax material harvesting and to capture enemy oxcarts fully loaded with spot tax grain. We destroyed the oxcarts, capturing the oxen as well as the spot tax material.

Chill Bong San (Chill means seven, Bong means peaks, san means mountains) was my ambush partisan secret base. One of my agents on the mainland one day asked me to move a whole village to Cho-do where they could find safety. Despite receiving some resistance from the enemy, we moved 23 families with more than 140 people, including children and very aged people to Cho-do. It was a great labor to escort the 140 people including those infants and aged people all the way to Cho-do.

We captured two enemy fishing boats on the ocean near Shin-hwa.

It was getting colder and colder day by day as the winter of 1951-1952 came. Therefore, operations could not be any more active. We could keep just barely as active as when it became winter. However, our intelligence activity remained diligent.

For the winter season our people were busy with obtaining fire wood and capturing some food from the enemy.

Suddenly, on 1 January 1952, we had news that our leader, Mr Chang

had been assassinated. The leader Chang himself, from my point of view, is as follows: His strong points--First, he was a powerful and strong man and full of spirit; Second, he had a quick and good judgement; Third, he had no love of the material; Fourth, whatever he planned to do or whatever he ordered to do was carried out. His weak point -- in his personnel affairs, he had nominated his kin to many important positions. As a result of this personnel policy he had quite a few people complaining. However, guerrilla forces are quite different from the regular forces. A guerrilla leader, in certain respects, should be strong for his policy and there should be a strong belief in what he orders his guerrillas to do. I would like to say again that only strong character is able to control guerrilla forces. It is also true that the strong-character policy is liable to be called by those people who do not know what the military organization is, and what the guerrilla organization should be, a dictator's policy. But it is truely wounderful the tremendous things that had been done by the leader Chang.

Let me present you a summary of my operations from March 1951 to 31 December 1951.

I had participated in surprise raids during that period in six places mainly. I had led ambushes in more than twenty places. During the period March to December 1951, we captured about 55 Russian rifles, 12 PPSHs, captured enemy soldiers and induced about 23 enemy to surrender to me, killed approximately 280 NKA's captured four sail junks, destroyed fourteen buildings, captured approximately 130 oxen, captured approximately 150 bags of rice, including some grain, and rescued refugees and loyal youth out of the mainland, approximately 410 of them.

Here is how we attacked Song-ha hot springs.

With eleven men I left Pak-sok-san for Song-ha-chon. On the way I felt I had to find one guide because I had established my operation plan according to the map without the accurate latest information. I found a hunter whose name was unknown to me. I captured the hunter and said that

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I was going to shoot him because he was a Communist. He said he was not a Communist and to please spare his life. So I said that I would spare his life but he would have to give me the whole story about Song-ha -- who were in Song-ha and what they were, and how many there were, and so on.

I also had one radio operator who was quite familiar with the Song-ha area and what the hunter said was what the radio operator was saying. So I took him with my unit. At thattime I was getting my food in from my base and from the village by the kindness of friendly civilians and other people who were willing to help us even though they were not exactly friendly adherents. This was happening at night. Also I was getting food from the enemy by capturing it.

To make sure my information was accurate, I called on the chief of the ROK Youth Group which had been organized when the UN Forces had advanced into the area. His name was Won Byong Hun, the present Donkey 3 S4. The man was still in the village at that time. I asked him to go with me. So having two more men my strength became thirteen men. The chief of the Youth Group gave me some more information on the enemy in the area.

It was the rainy season. In that countryside there are many creeks, streams, and rivers and, as it continued to rain, every creek was full of water. Crossing the creeks and streams I finally reached my destination. There were four places which I wanted to hit. One was a police station detachment. One was the Communist Party Myon Detachment office, another was the myon office, and the fourth was where a platoon of enemy garrison stayed in that town. These four places were separated. I had divided my people into four groups and the first group was called the police detachment group, the second the Communist Party Myon Detachment group, the third was the myon group and the fourth was the enemy platoon group.

Later on I found that nobody was in the myon Communist Party Detachment office because they were holding a great conference to make prop-

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aganda about receiving Czechoslovakian material, clothing and even some pencils, saying that they were getting such fine materials from their ally Czechoslovakia.

Also, I decided to cancel my raid on the enemy platoon location because I had too small a number of men to attack the whole platoon. However, the new mission of the enemy platoon group was to fight the platoon in case it came to reinforce the police station detachment, which was my main target.

I was one of the members of the group which attacked the police station detachment. Six policemen were in the station and many people were gathered in the myon office to take part in the conference. The members of the Communist Myon Party Detachment were there. Also the chief committee of Song-ha was at the conference. Since it was the final conference, many people were gathered there in the myon office. It was 0005 hours.

Around the police station were several trees which served the purpose of a fence or hedge.

At that time our equipment was three carbines, six M1s, one PPSH, one Russian light machine gun. The two extra men who had joined my raiding party had one hunting gun and one rifle.

A volley fire took place when three rounds were fired by me as the signal to open fire. Immediately the windows of the enemy police station detachment were broken and some of the enemy policemen were shot on the spot and some were wounded.

Then I heard some children crying in the back yard of the police station. So after I took the police station detachment, capturing some policemen and killing the rest of them, I went to the back yard of the police station. When I first heard the children crying I thought I had raided some civilian house by mistake. When I went to the back yard of the police station I found an air raid shelter which was being used as a jail. Thirty-two people were in that jail. Some of them were friendly

civilians, some were loyal youths who were in hiding, so I released them from the jail.

At the police station, I captured one pistol, killed eight policemen, captured seven rifles such as the Japanese 99 and the Japanese 38, and captured documents and papers.

When we attacked the myon office, a Communist chief of the local law court escaped from the building. One NKA 1st lieutenant, titled "culture propagandist," was shot, and six members of the myon office staff were killed. Meantime, to keep the enemy platoon from reinforcing the myon office, I used a trick. I placed several blocks of TNT without intention of destroying anything but just to make a big noise. Also I placed the empty brass of 40-mm. shells all around the area. When I ordered the machine gun to fire, then I said, "Heavy machine gun, fire!" To the carbine men I said, "Light machine gun, fire!" To throw hand grenades or TNT I said, "Mortar, (or direct gun), fire!" I shouted loudly to let the enemy hear.

I burned the myon office building completely down. While we were shooting the enemy, blasting the TNT, throwing hand grenades, firing carbines and light machine gun, and shouting the false orders, the one enemy platoon about which I was the most worried was on the way to reinforce the myon office. When they heard the false orders they went back and took up defensive positions, which was done in vain because I did not attack them. I had no casualties.

When Chang, the leader was killed, I was going to come down to Leopard CP right away. However, the American adviser who was on Cho-do with me suggested it was not wise to come down to Leopard CP considering my situation because I was one of the best staff members of the man assassinated. Furthermore there were numerous delicate troubles between Donkey 3 and Donkey 4.

To get the supplies, I sent my chief of staff to Leopard. However, Major McKean told my chief of staff he would not give any supplies

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until Donkey 3 leader came down to Leopard. Donkey 4 had not been distributing the supplies fairly. Therefore, Donkey 3 was separated from Donkey 4. Donkey 3 became an independent unit, getting supplies directly from the CP.

Taking advantage of the trouble in Donkey 3 and Donkey 4, my Chief of Staff, Chong Song Yong, had secretly planned to make a revolution to get rid of me, to become leader of the unit himself. His trick was so secretly and subtly made that I was not aware of the scheme until the last minute. Actually there was both the internal trouble caused by the traitor chief of staff and also the external trouble aroused by the leader's assassination. My heart was busy and broken.

One day they held a meeting and the chief of staff and his group said I was to leave Donkey 3. It was all right with me to leave the unit, but I had to clear myself and the unit first. At the meeting, I asked all Donkey 3 members what mistakes I had made and for what reason I had to leave the unit. If there was any mistake that I had made when leading Donkey 3, I would be glad to leave the unit. Also I told them I had lost my younger brother. A member of Donkey 3, he was sent to Donkey 4 to reinforce their unit on Mahap-to. He was killed on the mainland, crossing from Mahap-to. Therefore my mother and sisters were helpless. I had given no support to my family out of what I had captured, by the risk of my life, in spite of the fact that I was obligated to support my helpless mother and sisters. In a way I would be content to step down because to be leader of the unit was to be constantly risking my life. It is my view that the leader should be the first man to go to the mainland with his men. I also had a love of my life. Nevertheless, I was not going to leave the unit until I saw the reason for which I was blamed.

When I asked that question at the conference, none of them gave me any answer. They had no valid reason to get me out of the unit. Then the American advisor, Lieutenant O'Connor, becoming aware of the true

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situation, announced that, according to the order of the CP, he was going to arrest anybody who was participating in the betrayal. I said I preferred leaving the unit. The people might do a better job for the unit if I left. My mind was full of many thoughts of the internal trouble and the external troubles between Donkey 3 and Donkey 4. Everybody of the unit was excited, but I chose peace of mind, and I renounced what Lieutenant O'Conner said. I went back to my unit and I told the people who were my old men, "Now that I find no particular reason given by you people, I will leave this unit." It was February 1952, the last day of my stay with Donkey 3.

After I left, the traitor chief of staff was quite happy for he was confident that he was going to be the leader, taking my place. They had, I heard, held several conferences and it turned out the Donkey 3 people were not so happy with the traitor chief of staff. These people said that they could not see any particular reason why the former leader had to leave them. Then Chong, the Chief of Staff, proposed to elect the new leader by vote. It was not Chong, but Chae Dong Ha who was voted as leader. I turned all business over to the new leader and I went down to Leopard CP. I asked Major McKean to be released from Leopard operation; however, Major McKean did not allow me to leave him. He appointed me leader of the Honor Guard at his headquarters.

After I became Honor Guard leader, I had two months of special and regular American Army training, including paratrooper training. I performed two operations as honor guard with two Americans on the mainland. In one operation I lost two men in an enemy mined area.

Throughout my guerrilla life from its beginning until today, I have lost only five of my men.

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